Ndeumeni's Case Summary

In the present action, Ndeumeni’s motion for summary judgment was based on the premise that because the alleged agreement made between Ndeumeni and Kemogne failed to satisfy the statute of frauds, she should be precluded from arguing that there was an agreement under a theory sounding in tort. Initially, we observe that in her original complaint Kemogne did allege that Ndeumeni breached a contract with her. Plainly, a breach of contract claim could not be sustained where it is undisputed that the parties failed to comply with the statute of frauds with respect to their agreement to transfer real property. Accordingly, Kemogne filed an amended complaint withdrawing her allegations of fraud and instead pursuing a claim under a theory of promissory …show more content…
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 221 Md. App. 601, 635 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 29 (2005)). At issue in this action is whether Ndeumeni made a representation to Kemogne with knowledge or reckless indifference to its inaccuracy. Ndeumeni, for his part, argues that Kemogne may not argue in favor of the existence of a contract with regard to the property in the absence of a written agreement. Indeed,
[n]o action may be brought on any contract for the sale or disposition of land or of any interest in or concerning land unless the contract on which the action is brought, or some memorandum or note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or some other person lawfully authorized by …show more content…
For example, “[w]e have long adhered to the objective theory of contract interpretation, giving effect to the clear terms of agreements, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time of contract formation.” Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 198 (2006) (emphases added). The statute of frauds, then, is but one cog in a broader judicial construct that aims to articulate the objective meaning of an agreement between individuals. A tort action for fraud, however, is fundamentally distinguishable because it hinges on the subjective intent of the speaker when the statement was made that caused another harm. Tufts v. Poore, 219 Md. 1, 12 (1959) (“The gist of the fraud in such cases is not the failure to perform the agreement, but the fraudulent intent of the promisor, the false representation of an existing intention to perform where such intent is in fact non-existent, and the deception of the promisee by such false