National Security Strategy and China Arthur Lykke, of the Army War College, modeled strategy with his simple National Security Strategy model. Lykke defined the pillars of National strategy as the ends (objectives), ways (methods used), and means (resources available) on which military and, ultimately, National Strategy are balanced. Imbalance of any pillar incurs strategic risk. Suitability, feasibility, and acceptability are the criteria from the pillars are evaluated. Suitability: can we accomplish the desired effect? Feasibility: can the task be completed with the means available? Acceptability: are the costs justified?. China presents a burgeoning national security threat to the United States militarily, economically, and politically.
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i). The NSS prescribes long-standing alliances, coalitions, and the international community as the principle means of sustaining National Security. Specifically, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) are used to promote, “regional support for international economic norms that are vital to maintaining it as an engine for global economic growth” (NSS, pg. 24). Concerning China, these events, and agreements like it, served two purposes. First, the TPP would have enhanced economic growth for its signatories (Jeffrey A. Bader, Brookings: Why the TPP is the linchpin of the Asia rebalance, July 28, 2015, pg. 1). The resulting growth would have benefited the U.S. through a gain of 77 Billion annually (Bader, pg. 1). Lastly, the agreement would have moved China towards the U.S. agenda of westernization improving U.S. trade and qualitatively decreasing the adversarial potential of China in the long term. Secondly, if China did not sign the accord, the TPP would have diverted trade away from China decreasing its ability to be a regional hegemon in the Pacific. Along these same lines, the NSS also advocated to, “Advance our economic partnership with Brazil” (NSS, pg 27). While seemingly unrelated, this statement directly addresses China’s growing soft power in South America. Chinese growth in South America seems harmless; however, “Although no specific event may directly threaten the U.S. national interest, the collective effect is to restructure the global flows of value-added and influence in a manner beneficial to China, making the ability of the United States to successfully pursue its own national goals and interests increasingly dependent on the acquiescence of the PRC.” (R. Evan Ellis, Joint Forces Quarterly (Issue 60,
i). The NSS prescribes long-standing alliances, coalitions, and the international community as the principle means of sustaining National Security. Specifically, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) are used to promote, “regional support for international economic norms that are vital to maintaining it as an engine for global economic growth” (NSS, pg. 24). Concerning China, these events, and agreements like it, served two purposes. First, the TPP would have enhanced economic growth for its signatories (Jeffrey A. Bader, Brookings: Why the TPP is the linchpin of the Asia rebalance, July 28, 2015, pg. 1). The resulting growth would have benefited the U.S. through a gain of 77 Billion annually (Bader, pg. 1). Lastly, the agreement would have moved China towards the U.S. agenda of westernization improving U.S. trade and qualitatively decreasing the adversarial potential of China in the long term. Secondly, if China did not sign the accord, the TPP would have diverted trade away from China decreasing its ability to be a regional hegemon in the Pacific. Along these same lines, the NSS also advocated to, “Advance our economic partnership with Brazil” (NSS, pg 27). While seemingly unrelated, this statement directly addresses China’s growing soft power in South America. Chinese growth in South America seems harmless; however, “Although no specific event may directly threaten the U.S. national interest, the collective effect is to restructure the global flows of value-added and influence in a manner beneficial to China, making the ability of the United States to successfully pursue its own national goals and interests increasingly dependent on the acquiescence of the PRC.” (R. Evan Ellis, Joint Forces Quarterly (Issue 60,