Moral Judgement Definition

Does the claim that moral judgements are intrinsically motivating provide a good justification for non-cognitivism? The cognitive/non-cognitive divide posits that mental states and processes fall into either a category of perception which is analytical, or a category of attitude which is affective or impulsive. A moral judgement must be linked to some mental process, and according to some theories, moral facts in fact originate from mental processes. Moral judgements seem to stem from a certain conviction, which is easily interpreted as a belief which a person holds about what is true and good. However, the fact that moral claims can invoke a given attitude or sentiment, and act so compellingly, makes it evident that “non-cognitive” processes must be at play. Ayer points out that even the communication of moral judgements does not involve reasoning, but rather appeals to desire and motivation. Lastly, it appears implausible that both non-cognitive and cognitive processes are simultaneously the cause for holding a certain moral view. The …show more content…
Even if moral facts are sui generis (Moore, in Blackburn), and distinct from other facts about the natural world, they must still exert a sort of impulse on those who believe them, they cause spark a conviction that they are not only true, but that an ought should follow. (A similar problem exists in utilitarian philosophy, where usually not only one’s own happiness but the happiness of all people, or a given society, must be considered to be considered a reason to act a certain way.) Moore’s cognitivism claims that these supposed moral facts do carry this impulse or sentiment, but it is then unclear why it should be the intuited truth of the fact which is convincing rather than the impulse of the moral claims alone. The cognitivist account is not needed to explain the motivational force of a moral claim, and the reason why the claim is