I agree with Meta ethical Subjectivism and shall therefore be trying to support the claim written above. Some arguments that support Meta ethical Subjectivism are the argument from moral motivation and the argument of economy. Objections to Meta ethical Subjectivism are that it allows for moral equivalence and can be quite arbitrary. Meta ethical Subjectivism suggests that moral judgements cannot be true or false because they are not trying to describe anything. Moral judgements are instead understood to be the expression of one’s feelings of approval or disapproval towards an action (Reason and Responsibility, Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, 2015, part 4, chpt. 2, pg603).
David Hume’s view of Meta ethical Subjectivism is referred to as the argument from moral motivation. The argument is that moral judgments motivate people without needing anything else to persuade them to do something unlike factual judgements that cannot motivate without something like a desire to add motivation. Therefore moral …show more content…
2, pg608). This means that if all moral views have the same potential to be true or ‘right’ then we must give equal weight to views that we do not agree with as being ‘right’, it means we cannot criticise rapists or assaulters because their behaviour is based on their moral ideas and they must be holding those beliefs sincerely and believe them to be true. Therefore, meaning that meta ethical subjectivists believe that moral judgements are just the vocalisation of taste, however the taste for ‘wrong’ things such as wanton cruelty is not considered worse than a taste for kindness (Reason and Responsibility, Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, 2015, part 4, chpt. 2,
David Hume’s view of Meta ethical Subjectivism is referred to as the argument from moral motivation. The argument is that moral judgments motivate people without needing anything else to persuade them to do something unlike factual judgements that cannot motivate without something like a desire to add motivation. Therefore moral …show more content…
2, pg608). This means that if all moral views have the same potential to be true or ‘right’ then we must give equal weight to views that we do not agree with as being ‘right’, it means we cannot criticise rapists or assaulters because their behaviour is based on their moral ideas and they must be holding those beliefs sincerely and believe them to be true. Therefore, meaning that meta ethical subjectivists believe that moral judgements are just the vocalisation of taste, however the taste for ‘wrong’ things such as wanton cruelty is not considered worse than a taste for kindness (Reason and Responsibility, Feinberg and Shafer-Landau, 2015, part 4, chpt. 2,