Operation HUSKY

Operation HUSKY was ultimately an Allied victory that met its objectives, but its planning and execution highlighted significant deficiencies in command and control and integration of Allied forces. Senior commanders, primarily General Eisenhower and British General Alexander, failed to adequately provide their staffs and subordinate commanders with clear intent, nor did they fully exploit the combined ground, air, and naval capabilities available to them. This essay identifies the shortcomings in Allied planning and execution in relation to mission command and the integration of joint functions during HUSKY. These shortcomings were not so grave as to bring about defeat, but they do provide vivid examples of faulty planning and execution when …show more content…
Eisenhower did not effectively establish and issue his intent for two reasons. First, planning for HUSKY commenced while he was still prosecuting the TORCH campaign as Commander, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). His chief of staff thus led the early planning effort but with limited authority and no experience in the Mediterranean theater of operations (MTO). Second, Eisenhower’s component commanders for HUSKY were likewise still engaged in TORCH and geographically dispersed around the MTO, making communication and coordination difficult in the important early planning stages. The distracted and disjointed arrangement of AFHQ and its components just months prior to HUSKY’s D-day limited Eisenhower’s ability to adequately develop and issue his intent. This contributed to his subordinate commander’s inability to develop a clear understanding of the campaign’s purpose and desired end …show more content…
The climate fostered by AFHQ leadership significantly contributed to the disjointedness and confusion in very linear environment and opposed by an inferior force. Command and control and integration shortcomings may not as easily be overcome in the increasingly complex and uncertain environment within which joint forces will operate today. Current doctrine has captured the hard-earned lessons from HUSKY and mitigates many of the issues encountered in that campaign. For example, land, air, and maritime forces do not operate autonomously but instead are integrated into joint force component commands (JFLCC, JFACC, and JFMCC) under a joint force commander. Best practices such as mission command and integration of joint functions are essential for the Joint Force to fight and win in today’s operating