Accomplish the Mission with the Principles of Mission Command
Trellis K. Littlejohn
SLC 25B Class 005-18
Abstract
Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander MG Franklin Hagenbeck was faced with a difficult task of rooting enemy forces out of Shahikot Valley. This was a task originally to be completed using ground forces and minimal air support. MG Hagenbeck also was challenged with being the head of an operation but not having Command authority over unit slated to support. With him only having one half of his Division MG Hagenbeck was undermanned, he requested assistance from the 101st Air Assault Division but even then he still came up short because they deployed without tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery. With the enemy …show more content…
The development the Anaconda battle plan: Hammer and Anvil created shared understanding and the use mission orders. (Kugler, 2007) Task Force Hammer knew their mission was to advance across the valley floor and engage enemy forces and destroy or capture them. Task Force Rakkasan was to establishing blocking positions at the passes leading through the mountains on the valley’s eastern side. This would leave the Taliban and al Qaeda exposed to attack by Zia’s troops. (Kugler, 2007) Seven blocking positions was also established using the 10th Mountain Division two companies assigned to three blocking position and one of 101st Air Assault Division’s companies assigned to the other four. In order the plan to execute properly Task force Hammer and Task Force Rakkasan had to arrive at the same time to trap the enemy and avoid the risk of friendly fire, a key understanding made going in the battle. There was also shared understanding with making sure Operation Anaconda was properly supplied, large amounts of fuel, ammo and other stocks were ordered in. Training was being conducted on helicopter lift and transit operations. Land zone and refueling points also were …show more content…
General Hagenbeck was giving command and control authority over Operation Anaconda by General Franks the CENTCOM commander at the time. General Mosely was in command of Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). CFACC and CAOC was the authority for all strike sortie and target. Which meant that Hagenbeck could only request air strikes not order them. CFACC and CACO were slated to provide support to Anaconda ground operations. Hagenbeck also did not have command authority over friendly Afghan forces slated to participate in Operation Anaconda. Afghan Forces operated under their own command structure. Although this multi-headed command structure was no problem at first Hagenbeck didn’t think he would need major close air support even considering it unnecessary. In turn, CFACC and CACO were often left out the initial planning for Operation Anaconda. Once in battle it was soon realized that CFACC and CACO would play a major part in the success of the operation. Day one of the battle forced coalition ground forces to retreat from the valley, in turn, help was called for U.S. Air Forces. Issues with the call for strike sortie arose because the ground units had to be passed to CFACC and CAOC creating time-consuming problems, only emergency close air strike were immediately granted and non- emergency would take between 25 -45
Trellis K. Littlejohn
SLC 25B Class 005-18
Abstract
Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander MG Franklin Hagenbeck was faced with a difficult task of rooting enemy forces out of Shahikot Valley. This was a task originally to be completed using ground forces and minimal air support. MG Hagenbeck also was challenged with being the head of an operation but not having Command authority over unit slated to support. With him only having one half of his Division MG Hagenbeck was undermanned, he requested assistance from the 101st Air Assault Division but even then he still came up short because they deployed without tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery. With the enemy …show more content…
The development the Anaconda battle plan: Hammer and Anvil created shared understanding and the use mission orders. (Kugler, 2007) Task Force Hammer knew their mission was to advance across the valley floor and engage enemy forces and destroy or capture them. Task Force Rakkasan was to establishing blocking positions at the passes leading through the mountains on the valley’s eastern side. This would leave the Taliban and al Qaeda exposed to attack by Zia’s troops. (Kugler, 2007) Seven blocking positions was also established using the 10th Mountain Division two companies assigned to three blocking position and one of 101st Air Assault Division’s companies assigned to the other four. In order the plan to execute properly Task force Hammer and Task Force Rakkasan had to arrive at the same time to trap the enemy and avoid the risk of friendly fire, a key understanding made going in the battle. There was also shared understanding with making sure Operation Anaconda was properly supplied, large amounts of fuel, ammo and other stocks were ordered in. Training was being conducted on helicopter lift and transit operations. Land zone and refueling points also were …show more content…
General Hagenbeck was giving command and control authority over Operation Anaconda by General Franks the CENTCOM commander at the time. General Mosely was in command of Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). CFACC and CAOC was the authority for all strike sortie and target. Which meant that Hagenbeck could only request air strikes not order them. CFACC and CACO were slated to provide support to Anaconda ground operations. Hagenbeck also did not have command authority over friendly Afghan forces slated to participate in Operation Anaconda. Afghan Forces operated under their own command structure. Although this multi-headed command structure was no problem at first Hagenbeck didn’t think he would need major close air support even considering it unnecessary. In turn, CFACC and CACO were often left out the initial planning for Operation Anaconda. Once in battle it was soon realized that CFACC and CACO would play a major part in the success of the operation. Day one of the battle forced coalition ground forces to retreat from the valley, in turn, help was called for U.S. Air Forces. Issues with the call for strike sortie arose because the ground units had to be passed to CFACC and CAOC creating time-consuming problems, only emergency close air strike were immediately granted and non- emergency would take between 25 -45