The rapid acquisition program established to procure the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle was a success story that significantly differed from normal procurement programs. For limited time-sensitive requirements, this acquisition method is effective but, should not be adopted for traditional Department of Defense (DOD) Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The amount of senior leader involvement and risk acceptance required for the MRAP program would not be suitable or sustainable for traditional strategically focused MDAPs. To understand how unique the MRAP procurement was, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the circumstances that led to the hasty establishment of the MRAP program.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom …show more content…
“Even more extraordinary, however, was that…testing was underway for seven competing manufacturers and production contracts had already been awarded to five companies.” By the time the JROC approved the CPD in May 2007, there were already five manufacturers providing Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of MRAPs. While the MRAP JPO used the standard DOD acquisition process, the process was greatly tailored. The tailoring was designed to hasten the process by accomplishing “parallel execution of as many elements of the acquisition framework as feasibly possible.” Having multiple manufacturers already on contract for MRAP LRIP as the CPD was being approved was one example of parallel process execution. “Secretary Gates’ emphasis further streamlined the MRAP program and mobilized all resources in its support.” This tailored process and senior leader emphasis made the MRAP procurement extremely fast but, forced DOD to incur sizable risk acceptance for the …show more content…
“[T]he Marines contend that MRAPs are not expeditionary because of logistical requirements and are not shipboard compatible.” As a joint solution, deployability would have been a KSA but, because of the speed of acquisition, the MRAP did not include rapid deployment requirements.
However, the lack of MRAP suitability that makes it a poor choice for long term utilization across the Joint Force is not the result of inherent design flaws. The majority of MRAPs delivered met the very narrow requirements of the JPO. Instead, MRAP shortcomings reflect the suboptimal strategic outcomes that result from a hastened acquisition process tailored to address a very specific tactical problem.
In conclusion, the MRAP program was significantly different from normal DOD procurement programs. While it used the normal acquisition process, the process was tailored to waive many regulatory requirements and concurrently execute statutory requirements to hasten vehicle procurement. The process also required substantial intervention and oversight by Congress and the Secretary of Defense in order to be successful. While the MRAP program achieved rapid procurement of a more IED survivable vehicle, this acquisition method should not be adopted for traditional DOD MDAPs. The amount of senior leader involvement and the risk acceptance required is not suitable
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom …show more content…
“Even more extraordinary, however, was that…testing was underway for seven competing manufacturers and production contracts had already been awarded to five companies.” By the time the JROC approved the CPD in May 2007, there were already five manufacturers providing Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of MRAPs. While the MRAP JPO used the standard DOD acquisition process, the process was greatly tailored. The tailoring was designed to hasten the process by accomplishing “parallel execution of as many elements of the acquisition framework as feasibly possible.” Having multiple manufacturers already on contract for MRAP LRIP as the CPD was being approved was one example of parallel process execution. “Secretary Gates’ emphasis further streamlined the MRAP program and mobilized all resources in its support.” This tailored process and senior leader emphasis made the MRAP procurement extremely fast but, forced DOD to incur sizable risk acceptance for the …show more content…
“[T]he Marines contend that MRAPs are not expeditionary because of logistical requirements and are not shipboard compatible.” As a joint solution, deployability would have been a KSA but, because of the speed of acquisition, the MRAP did not include rapid deployment requirements.
However, the lack of MRAP suitability that makes it a poor choice for long term utilization across the Joint Force is not the result of inherent design flaws. The majority of MRAPs delivered met the very narrow requirements of the JPO. Instead, MRAP shortcomings reflect the suboptimal strategic outcomes that result from a hastened acquisition process tailored to address a very specific tactical problem.
In conclusion, the MRAP program was significantly different from normal DOD procurement programs. While it used the normal acquisition process, the process was tailored to waive many regulatory requirements and concurrently execute statutory requirements to hasten vehicle procurement. The process also required substantial intervention and oversight by Congress and the Secretary of Defense in order to be successful. While the MRAP program achieved rapid procurement of a more IED survivable vehicle, this acquisition method should not be adopted for traditional DOD MDAPs. The amount of senior leader involvement and the risk acceptance required is not suitable