II. Limitations of Mill's individuality and the inevitability of social control
As Berkowitz (2000) describes, Mill exemplifies a 'spirit of an indecisive man, one who on some days woke up in a liberal and rationalist mood and on other days got out of bed in a conservative and romantic frame of mind' (p.135). While the critic adds that Mill explained this bias by the fact that no truth is impartial, this ambivalence of his ideas makes some arguments in favour of individuality less unconvincing. This is clearly the case with Mill's complex relationship with paternalism, where his opposition often suffers from practical uncertainty, liberal biases, elitism, and the idea of utility outside of Utilitarian ideals.
Limitations of the 'harm' principle …show more content…
According to Feinberg (1986), soft paternalism may 'prevent self-regarding harmful conduct (...) when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary' (p.12); this also constitutes nonvolutary acts are acts made in ignorance of existing dangers. Such reasoning is in accord with Mill's principles. Unlike hard paternalism, oblivious to one's competence or will, soft paternalism does not necessarily compromise liberalism; rather, it promotes incentives and a justified need for state control. In other words, Mill acknowledges scenarios in which paternalism is not only allowed but also recommended (Ryan, …show more content…
However, it must be assumed that the person is unaware of his condition, and that he or she does not with to cross the bridge regardless of the danger. Consequently, a paternalistic intervention is allowed because one assumes that the person involved is not sufficiently informed (Mill, [1859] 2009). In this and similar cases, Mill questions one's ability to reason, and allows an external force to act. As Young (2008) observes, when Mill accepts this situation he also suggests a degree of flexibility between state control and personal liberty. On Liberty also permits similar cases of state interference for public (not private) gambling and prostitution, and thus Mill's proposed practical policies follow a framework of soft paternalism on numerous occasions. While Feinberg (1986) indicates that these instances are 'closer to the liberalism of Mill than to the protectiveness of hard paternalism' (Feinberg, 1986, p.12), Cohen-Almagor (2012) terms Mill's regulatory propositions 'elastic paternalism' (p.557). Hence, there is no clear line between soft and hard versions of state interference mechanisms. Mill thus overwhelmingly argues for public coercion and private freedoms, and this approach makes it difficult to consider his theories decisively anti-paternalistic. As a result, Young (2008) reasons that Mill's ideals of liberty
As Berkowitz (2000) describes, Mill exemplifies a 'spirit of an indecisive man, one who on some days woke up in a liberal and rationalist mood and on other days got out of bed in a conservative and romantic frame of mind' (p.135). While the critic adds that Mill explained this bias by the fact that no truth is impartial, this ambivalence of his ideas makes some arguments in favour of individuality less unconvincing. This is clearly the case with Mill's complex relationship with paternalism, where his opposition often suffers from practical uncertainty, liberal biases, elitism, and the idea of utility outside of Utilitarian ideals.
Limitations of the 'harm' principle …show more content…
According to Feinberg (1986), soft paternalism may 'prevent self-regarding harmful conduct (...) when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary' (p.12); this also constitutes nonvolutary acts are acts made in ignorance of existing dangers. Such reasoning is in accord with Mill's principles. Unlike hard paternalism, oblivious to one's competence or will, soft paternalism does not necessarily compromise liberalism; rather, it promotes incentives and a justified need for state control. In other words, Mill acknowledges scenarios in which paternalism is not only allowed but also recommended (Ryan, …show more content…
However, it must be assumed that the person is unaware of his condition, and that he or she does not with to cross the bridge regardless of the danger. Consequently, a paternalistic intervention is allowed because one assumes that the person involved is not sufficiently informed (Mill, [1859] 2009). In this and similar cases, Mill questions one's ability to reason, and allows an external force to act. As Young (2008) observes, when Mill accepts this situation he also suggests a degree of flexibility between state control and personal liberty. On Liberty also permits similar cases of state interference for public (not private) gambling and prostitution, and thus Mill's proposed practical policies follow a framework of soft paternalism on numerous occasions. While Feinberg (1986) indicates that these instances are 'closer to the liberalism of Mill than to the protectiveness of hard paternalism' (Feinberg, 1986, p.12), Cohen-Almagor (2012) terms Mill's regulatory propositions 'elastic paternalism' (p.557). Hence, there is no clear line between soft and hard versions of state interference mechanisms. Mill thus overwhelmingly argues for public coercion and private freedoms, and this approach makes it difficult to consider his theories decisively anti-paternalistic. As a result, Young (2008) reasons that Mill's ideals of liberty