Mill's Consequences Of Utilitarianism In Mill And Kant
Here Mill considers of consequences in moral action, as we will see, Mill’s consequentialism rather than Utilitarianism is the direct charge made to Kant, these two notions are not same, the utiitlirms principle is seek happiness and avoid pain, precisely moral action would be conducted on maximizing happiness and minimizing …show more content…
To answer this, Silber points out that in the Kantian kingdom agents are all good-natured and well-behaved. We may then, appropriately ask: Are these characteristics additional premises or simply the result of agents acting under the moral law? Only the latter would be true to Kant’s ethics. I think Silber’s interpretation is essentially close to Kant’s perspective in so far as maxims derive from moral propriety such as self-preservation or security, rather than moral goodness.
As I will precisely discuss this in section of Silber’s procedurlism(2.1.1), I argue although Silber has defended Kant’s ethics against the charge of consequentialism to some degree, he has not done so in an essential way. Kantian consequentialism or specifically subjunctive consequentialism still seems unable to inform a permissible or impermissible maxim. If the subjunctive consequences possess no moral weight, Kant will be no better off than a Utilitarian who contends that Kant’s ethics is completely formal. Utilitarianism straightforwardly holds that the consequences of an act compromise the moral weight in the procedure, as, for example, when an agent prefers satisfaction or happiness. However, why is happiness held as the means by which one justifies consequences or maximized good, rather than suffering? Utilitarianism does not pretend to give a purely formal answer. Likewise, Kant must assign some moral content to subjunctive consequences. While much detail may exist in these consequences through the typic (the nature of law) and while all possibilities of the kingdom of ends might be specified and imagined, the permissibility of maxims is still