D521 O91
At the begining of September, however, this was not yet evident. On the contrary, the apparent imminence of Frence defeat and surrender promted German leaders to prepare peace conditions “for the eventuality of sudden negotiations which should not be protracted.” With the approval of Chancellor Theobaid von Bethmann Hollweg, a lengthy memorandum (of 9 Spetember) stipulated that ‘France must be so weakened that it cannot revive again as a great power [while] Russia must be pushed back as far as possible from the german eastern border and its dominion over the non-Russian cassal peoples broken.’ Although probably desiged for the anticipated seperate peace with France the memorandum none the less represented the basic goals of most German …show more content…
It was not Allied tactical superiority which eneded the war, then: it was a crisis of German morale, and this can only partly be attributed to the exogenous force of Allied infantry and artillery. (8 August?)
D613 G59
Wars can end only when the minimum terms of sttlement of both sides become compatible, when both are asking no more thant the other side is willing to give up.
The counter argument is that the war ends when one side is so defeated that it has to accept the terms offered by the wining side.
Germany’s leaders agreed in late 1916 that they were unexpectedly in a worse position than in late 1915, they still increased Germany’s war aims [...due to] a desire to reap enough profit on the war to buy off the domestic oppositioon.
France and Britain lowered their war aims when they received unfavourable new information.
Statemen involved in a war, considering intervention in an ongoing war, or trying to end a war between other parties need to be aware of the fundamental logic of war
At the begining of September, however, this was not yet evident. On the contrary, the apparent imminence of Frence defeat and surrender promted German leaders to prepare peace conditions “for the eventuality of sudden negotiations which should not be protracted.” With the approval of Chancellor Theobaid von Bethmann Hollweg, a lengthy memorandum (of 9 Spetember) stipulated that ‘France must be so weakened that it cannot revive again as a great power [while] Russia must be pushed back as far as possible from the german eastern border and its dominion over the non-Russian cassal peoples broken.’ Although probably desiged for the anticipated seperate peace with France the memorandum none the less represented the basic goals of most German …show more content…
It was not Allied tactical superiority which eneded the war, then: it was a crisis of German morale, and this can only partly be attributed to the exogenous force of Allied infantry and artillery. (8 August?)
D613 G59
Wars can end only when the minimum terms of sttlement of both sides become compatible, when both are asking no more thant the other side is willing to give up.
The counter argument is that the war ends when one side is so defeated that it has to accept the terms offered by the wining side.
Germany’s leaders agreed in late 1916 that they were unexpectedly in a worse position than in late 1915, they still increased Germany’s war aims [...due to] a desire to reap enough profit on the war to buy off the domestic oppositioon.
France and Britain lowered their war aims when they received unfavourable new information.
Statemen involved in a war, considering intervention in an ongoing war, or trying to end a war between other parties need to be aware of the fundamental logic of war