Principal Decisions.
The group decided to take three principle actions involving the use of military forces in the Persian Gulf. Our first decision was in response to Iran smuggling automatic rifles and hand held rocket launchers in Saudi Arabia to aid Saudi rebels. The Joint Chief of Staff recommended a higher military presence. As a result, the President ordered 120 special ops to move secretly and strategically into Dhahran to counter the influx of light arms. The next decision was in response to an attack on Saudi Arabia’s North Eastern base. Despite little information on the attack, the President and Joint Chief of Staff recommended moving 550 troops from the Kuwaiti base to assist in defending the base. Finally our last decision …show more content…
I was most successful with decisions that directly fell within the purview of my role. For example, the troop movements to address the influx of light weaponry and to defend the United States base in Saudi Arabia were decisions I advocated for and they were implemented in official actions.
On the other hand, I was not successful enough in persuading the group to appeal to the demands of the workers on strike. It is unsure if the uprising of the workers on strike was inevitable, but I strongly favored appealing to their original demands of higher wages and better working conditions. In addition, when the U.S. base in Saudi Arabia was attacked most of the group looked to the Joint Chief of Staff to make the decision. I was surprised when almost everyone agreed with me when I suggested moving 550 troops from Kuwait. Some of the decisions made, could have been connected to the specialization of each member of the group. For example, the Secretary of the Treasury had almost entire control over the economic decisions our group made. The highly specialized roles had almost complete decision-making power when it came to making decisions within the purview of that
The group decided to take three principle actions involving the use of military forces in the Persian Gulf. Our first decision was in response to Iran smuggling automatic rifles and hand held rocket launchers in Saudi Arabia to aid Saudi rebels. The Joint Chief of Staff recommended a higher military presence. As a result, the President ordered 120 special ops to move secretly and strategically into Dhahran to counter the influx of light arms. The next decision was in response to an attack on Saudi Arabia’s North Eastern base. Despite little information on the attack, the President and Joint Chief of Staff recommended moving 550 troops from the Kuwaiti base to assist in defending the base. Finally our last decision …show more content…
I was most successful with decisions that directly fell within the purview of my role. For example, the troop movements to address the influx of light weaponry and to defend the United States base in Saudi Arabia were decisions I advocated for and they were implemented in official actions.
On the other hand, I was not successful enough in persuading the group to appeal to the demands of the workers on strike. It is unsure if the uprising of the workers on strike was inevitable, but I strongly favored appealing to their original demands of higher wages and better working conditions. In addition, when the U.S. base in Saudi Arabia was attacked most of the group looked to the Joint Chief of Staff to make the decision. I was surprised when almost everyone agreed with me when I suggested moving 550 troops from Kuwait. Some of the decisions made, could have been connected to the specialization of each member of the group. For example, the Secretary of the Treasury had almost entire control over the economic decisions our group made. The highly specialized roles had almost complete decision-making power when it came to making decisions within the purview of that