Since the late 1950s, the split of Sino-Soviet relationship continued expanding in the 1960s under the post-Stalin Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership. In spite of Khrushchev’s downfall in 1965, the Chinese rejected any possibility of accommodation with the Soviet Union, meanwhile domestically pursuing a reversal of professionalization of the People’s Liberation Army to support its politicization doctrine. The major connection of these two policies exists in the ideological fissures derived from the late 1950s between the Chinese chairman Mao Zedong and the Soviet leader Khrushchev. A series of international as well as domestic chaos throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in the increasing ideological polemics between the Chinese and
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The framework provided by cooperation of Moscow and Beijing during the early 1950s was transforming China into a socialist state along the Soviet model. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev as Stalin’s successor, however, sought to relieve the tensions with the west and embarked on the détente policy with the United States. The Soviets desired a nonviolent victory of the world socialists and a peaceful transition to socialism in each country. On the contrary, Mao defined the era as one of eternal revolution and wars. Taking into account the possibility of a nuclear war, Khrushchev’s global strategy was transforming the Soviet Union towards what the Chinese regarded as “revisionism”. Without a common goal, the relationship would eventually doom as Mao insisted on a tougher line toward the …show more content…
The article titled “ Long Live the Victory of People’s War” by Lin Biao in 1965 espoused the Maoist military doctrine while summarizing the experiences of the Chinese in the struggle against the imperialism as a model from which other nations could learn. Under the prevalence of the doctrine of the people’s war, the PLA was transforming into a tool of political and ideological indoctrination. As a reversal of military professionalization, military ranks were abolished, and the army was urged to learn from model PLA soldiers, represented by Lei Feng, who was completely dedicated to the teaching of Mao’s writings and Chinese revolution. As a result, instead of developing military forces, the role of the PLA had become the defender of the Chinese revolution and the biggest school of Mao’s
The framework provided by cooperation of Moscow and Beijing during the early 1950s was transforming China into a socialist state along the Soviet model. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev as Stalin’s successor, however, sought to relieve the tensions with the west and embarked on the détente policy with the United States. The Soviets desired a nonviolent victory of the world socialists and a peaceful transition to socialism in each country. On the contrary, Mao defined the era as one of eternal revolution and wars. Taking into account the possibility of a nuclear war, Khrushchev’s global strategy was transforming the Soviet Union towards what the Chinese regarded as “revisionism”. Without a common goal, the relationship would eventually doom as Mao insisted on a tougher line toward the …show more content…
The article titled “ Long Live the Victory of People’s War” by Lin Biao in 1965 espoused the Maoist military doctrine while summarizing the experiences of the Chinese in the struggle against the imperialism as a model from which other nations could learn. Under the prevalence of the doctrine of the people’s war, the PLA was transforming into a tool of political and ideological indoctrination. As a reversal of military professionalization, military ranks were abolished, and the army was urged to learn from model PLA soldiers, represented by Lei Feng, who was completely dedicated to the teaching of Mao’s writings and Chinese revolution. As a result, instead of developing military forces, the role of the PLA had become the defender of the Chinese revolution and the biggest school of Mao’s