Lyndon B. Johnson (commonly referred to as LBJ) became President of the United States when President John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Along with the presidency, LBJ also inherited the task of dealing with the situation in Vietnam, although he resisted action as it could have threatened his election. After serving out Kennedy’s presidency, LBJ was elected in a landslide victory, winning 61% of the vote, and 44 states. President LBJ now had the daunting duty to make a decision in Vietnam. The situation in Vietnam had worsened in that past few years and South Vietnam, whom the United States were supporting with approximately 75’000 soldiers , were losing. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam/The Viet Cong’s guerrilla warfare, overwhelmingly more
…show more content…
He was one of the few people close to LBJ that believed that escalating American involvement in Vietnam was a mistake. In 1965, he wrote a memo that is referred to now as “George Ball dissents.” The aim of this memo was to hopefully sway LBJ’s decision by citing North Vietnamese advantages and an uncertain and improbable victory for the United States. He opens the memo by stating the fact that the war was at that point a losing war. He goes on to say that “white” troops have no experience in guerilla warfare, and sending any number of troops could call be a waste a life, because more troops guarantees nothing in a such a foreign environment. He cited three recent attacks that proves his theory that more troops do not necessarily ensure victory. The first example was a sneak attack on the Da Nang Air Base that was guarded by 9’000 US Marines. The second one being a B-52 raid who failed their mission as the Viet-Cong had been given inside information of the upcoming attacks. The third and final event was a search and destroy mission, but the mission returned once again, only this time with 23 US casualties, but not a single encounter with the VC as they had once again been tipped off. He points out that once the troops are deployed, the ill-equipped troops will begin to suffer immense casualties, which will lead to a war that is impossible to leave. He suggests that striking a treaty an leaving Vietnam may have some short term adverse effects, but America’s overall credibility and prestige will stay intact, as opposed to leaving the was after a huge commitment. He then supplies LBJ with a detailed guide on how to proceed to reduce America’s casualties as much as possible. This includes a small military increase of 15 battalions, or 72’000 troops, and continued bombing of North Vietnam. He then proceeds to advise on how to go about eventually organising a treaty with North Vietnam. George
He was one of the few people close to LBJ that believed that escalating American involvement in Vietnam was a mistake. In 1965, he wrote a memo that is referred to now as “George Ball dissents.” The aim of this memo was to hopefully sway LBJ’s decision by citing North Vietnamese advantages and an uncertain and improbable victory for the United States. He opens the memo by stating the fact that the war was at that point a losing war. He goes on to say that “white” troops have no experience in guerilla warfare, and sending any number of troops could call be a waste a life, because more troops guarantees nothing in a such a foreign environment. He cited three recent attacks that proves his theory that more troops do not necessarily ensure victory. The first example was a sneak attack on the Da Nang Air Base that was guarded by 9’000 US Marines. The second one being a B-52 raid who failed their mission as the Viet-Cong had been given inside information of the upcoming attacks. The third and final event was a search and destroy mission, but the mission returned once again, only this time with 23 US casualties, but not a single encounter with the VC as they had once again been tipped off. He points out that once the troops are deployed, the ill-equipped troops will begin to suffer immense casualties, which will lead to a war that is impossible to leave. He suggests that striking a treaty an leaving Vietnam may have some short term adverse effects, but America’s overall credibility and prestige will stay intact, as opposed to leaving the was after a huge commitment. He then supplies LBJ with a detailed guide on how to proceed to reduce America’s casualties as much as possible. This includes a small military increase of 15 battalions, or 72’000 troops, and continued bombing of North Vietnam. He then proceeds to advise on how to go about eventually organising a treaty with North Vietnam. George