Lloyd George And Collins Case Study

Prior to treaty negotiations, Lloyd George and Collins effected one another’s actions because they were on opposing sides during the Anglo-Irish War where the IRB challenged the British presence in Ireland. After Sinn Fein candidates, Collins included, won seats in Parliament across Ireland, they refused to take their seats and instead formed their own parliament called Dail Earnnian. Lloyd George’s response to Sinn Fein’s establishment of an illegal parliament was not to try and forcefully coerce them back into the empire because he had gone into the Paris Peace Conference as a champion of oppressed minorities and as an advocate of small countries, and any act of forceful coercion would actively contradict this. Lloyd George’s hoped that …show more content…
As leader of the IRB, Collins developed this system because he knew that the Irish could not fight the British conventionally like the leaders of the Easter Rising had tried to do, and that guerilla warfare was the only chance they had at ever winning. As the attacks continued, Lloyd George changed his opinion about using force saying, “that the disorder must be put down at whatever cost”. Lloyd George and his government decided to create a police force of ex-servicemen, the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries, to combat the IRA, which only created more violence as the new police force used any means necessary to try and defeat the IRA, including killing innocent civilians. The conflict between Collin’s IRA and Lloyd George’s ex-soldier divisions of the RIC came to a head on the morning of 19 November 1920 when fourteen British officers were shot in their beds by agents of the IRA . In retaliation, the Auxiliary division of the RIC opened fire on a Gaelic football match which killed twelve …show more content…
Lloyd George’s initial opinion was that debate should center on Ireland remaining in the Empire and it’s loyalty to the Crown, but his cabinet approved of having unconditional debates with the Irish. This meant that the Irish were not limited to debating loyalty to the crown and status in the Empire, but that they could discuss anything that they felt need to be addressed. Therefore, the British delegation gave the Irish delegation more leeway than Lloyd George wanted and on 8 October 1921 when the Irish delegation arrived in London, noticeably without De Valera, they had a great chance to finally get some separation from Britain. Collins’ initial thoughts going into negotiations was that both delegations were equal and that the Irish could get something close to what they wanted. He also had a rough idea about Lloyd George from an informant who he had sent to do reports on the British delegates, who described Lloyd George as having “a charm that wins people” and as being “skilled in political strategy”. As the debates progressed, Collins realized that the British were far superior to the Irish delegation, and that the best that the Irish delegation could hope to get was dominion status . The reason for this change was that Lloyd George had assembled one of the greatest negotiating teams with men like