Is it absolutely necessary to assume that we are not free agents—could there in fact be some sort of God that dictates our every move? Though this notion is highly unlikely, morality is widely conceived hypothesis suggesting we are guided to do good by the grace of a God. Could it be that we are free in our thinking, that to observe suffering for example, is a bad thing that we must take upon ourselves to inhibit—or are we instructed to do so by someone else? Morality is, according to the theist, God’s command for our knowledge of right or wrong. And though morality is thought to exist, it’s explanation does not truly reason with why some atheists, or non-believers still have, to some capacity, a knowledge of what is good and bad without any
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This secular answer to the nature of goodness can be sought in an examination of ethics. Jonathan Berg attempts to explain how ethics are the similar to morality, in the way that we choose to do good or bad, in the same way that we are knowledgeable of the difference that we can be good or bad, and finally that we are motivated to do good or bad simply because we will ourselves to do so. Like Berg, this paper questions the relation between ethics and religion. In order to understand how ethics are comparable to morality, he and another writer in a separate article, Daniel Brink, address the three roles of morality in relation to those who are moral—these three dependences are labelled as the metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological dependences. In reference to Divine Command theory, Berg addresses that God and goodness are simply linguistic tautologies, or that the notion “God is good” is simply to praise good for being good. This linguistic version runs in to problems much in the same way that the Mavrodes argument does—what about those who do good without the belief of God? The argument then takes on an extensional equivalence in order to infer that God plays a role in ethics. This portion of the argument is framed by the Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma presents itself like
This secular answer to the nature of goodness can be sought in an examination of ethics. Jonathan Berg attempts to explain how ethics are the similar to morality, in the way that we choose to do good or bad, in the same way that we are knowledgeable of the difference that we can be good or bad, and finally that we are motivated to do good or bad simply because we will ourselves to do so. Like Berg, this paper questions the relation between ethics and religion. In order to understand how ethics are comparable to morality, he and another writer in a separate article, Daniel Brink, address the three roles of morality in relation to those who are moral—these three dependences are labelled as the metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological dependences. In reference to Divine Command theory, Berg addresses that God and goodness are simply linguistic tautologies, or that the notion “God is good” is simply to praise good for being good. This linguistic version runs in to problems much in the same way that the Mavrodes argument does—what about those who do good without the belief of God? The argument then takes on an extensional equivalence in order to infer that God plays a role in ethics. This portion of the argument is framed by the Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma presents itself like