LePoidevin argues that there is no way to reconcile this relationship of God and man without adopting some form of incompatibilism, that is to say that God being the cause of everything and man having free will are mutually exclusive concepts. LePoidevin does not see any way in which man cannot have free will, thus God must not have a causal relationship with the actions of man. However, as LePoidevin argues, this makes no sense, because it does not seem possible for God to cause man to exist such that his choices are utterly uncaused by anything but himself. This contradiction thus defeats any chance the theist has of reconciling free action with the existence of God as something causal. Ross would argue, however, that LePoidevin has made a few critical assumptions that make it impossible to understand the relationship at hand. First, LePoidevin assumes that man’s free actions must, in order to be free, be utterly and completely of man’s own power, and caused by nothing else. He also assumes, based on this, that there is no way to reconcile determinism with free will. Ross would strongly disagree. Ross’s argument conceives of free will in a different manner than LePoidevin’s. According to Ross, free will does not have to be completely uncaused and of man’s exclusive power, it just has to be the choice of the
LePoidevin argues that there is no way to reconcile this relationship of God and man without adopting some form of incompatibilism, that is to say that God being the cause of everything and man having free will are mutually exclusive concepts. LePoidevin does not see any way in which man cannot have free will, thus God must not have a causal relationship with the actions of man. However, as LePoidevin argues, this makes no sense, because it does not seem possible for God to cause man to exist such that his choices are utterly uncaused by anything but himself. This contradiction thus defeats any chance the theist has of reconciling free action with the existence of God as something causal. Ross would argue, however, that LePoidevin has made a few critical assumptions that make it impossible to understand the relationship at hand. First, LePoidevin assumes that man’s free actions must, in order to be free, be utterly and completely of man’s own power, and caused by nothing else. He also assumes, based on this, that there is no way to reconcile determinism with free will. Ross would strongly disagree. Ross’s argument conceives of free will in a different manner than LePoidevin’s. According to Ross, free will does not have to be completely uncaused and of man’s exclusive power, it just has to be the choice of the