Essay #2 Assignment
When it comes to names in philosophy, there are many different arguments and views for how names should be dealt with and in what situation. Linguistic tokens, such as names and referential terms, have been the center of philosophical questions into the nature of reference. In his book, Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke outlines his causal theory of reference for names. Gareth Evans, who, along with many others, was not satisfied with Kripke’s causal theory, wrote, The Causal Theory of Names, where he poses problems for Kripke’s view. The main attack was that the theory is not successfully in dealing with issues where the references of names change. Evans argument shows the most presence in his recognized Madagascar example. Though Evan’s communicates problems that are worthy of acknowledging, I believe that by examining the main ideas in Kripke’s causal theory of reference, the problems of reference change are not shattering to the theory. It is just that Kripke’s terms in the theory do not have enough description, not so much the fact that the theory can’t prove explanations for situations of reference change.
Kripke was not fully satisfied with the descriptive theory or the cluster theory, so as a result he proposed the causal theory. The theory begins with a causal chain where an initial baptism takes place. Having the idea of a baptism works in favor of avoiding various counterintuitive outcomes of the description theory and is evident in Kripke’s example of a man named Gödel. Referring to Gödel as “the man who proved the incompleteness theorem” and then learning in the future that Gödel plagiarized proof from Schmidt, means that using the name Gödel would be referring to Schmidt according to the descriptive theory. However, our instincts tell us that we are referring to Gödel. Kripke says, “it does not seem that if most of the ϕ’s are satisfied by a unique object γ, then γ is the referent of the name. This seems simply to be false.” (Kripke, Naming and Necessity). The causal theory proves to have clear advantages. In his Causal Theory of Names, Evans recognizes that Kripke’s theory has its benefits, but still feels that unamended it is not accurate. A crucial problem he has with the theory deals with Kripke’s initial baptism and that it’s unapparent which devices are being used when something is initially being denoted. The most description that Kripke gives about initial baptism’s is that, “When the name is 'passed from link to link,' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it." The issue Evans sees with this is that despite how vague or far-flung the causal relationship between a person’s use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, when the person uses the name they are still going to be referring to that object. Evidently it appears that the theory has no regards for context and so Evans likes to suggest it as a magic trick. “The capacity to denote something” has been passed on somehow and since its been passed on, there’s no way for it to ever be lost. Another concern of Evans about the causal theory, in the category of surrounding context, is that it does not fully justify the difference believing and denoting. There can be situations where a person may use a name and say something about the name that is true, and no causal chain from the person’s use of the term to the terms initial baptism will exist. An example would be a person who knows the method behind naming U.S. city streets, in that they are named numerically and chronologically. …show more content…
So it appears the main problem for the causal theory begins at a names initial baptism because once it’s given a reference, in the future, causally disseminated uses of the name will unavoidably be referring back to the reference given at the initial baptism. Regardless if the name in the future is widely accepted as referring to something else. That being said, I think that Evan’s criticism is successful if the causal theory is unamended, because instances of reference change are critical to
When it comes to names in philosophy, there are many different arguments and views for how names should be dealt with and in what situation. Linguistic tokens, such as names and referential terms, have been the center of philosophical questions into the nature of reference. In his book, Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke outlines his causal theory of reference for names. Gareth Evans, who, along with many others, was not satisfied with Kripke’s causal theory, wrote, The Causal Theory of Names, where he poses problems for Kripke’s view. The main attack was that the theory is not successfully in dealing with issues where the references of names change. Evans argument shows the most presence in his recognized Madagascar example. Though Evan’s communicates problems that are worthy of acknowledging, I believe that by examining the main ideas in Kripke’s causal theory of reference, the problems of reference change are not shattering to the theory. It is just that Kripke’s terms in the theory do not have enough description, not so much the fact that the theory can’t prove explanations for situations of reference change.
Kripke was not fully satisfied with the descriptive theory or the cluster theory, so as a result he proposed the causal theory. The theory begins with a causal chain where an initial baptism takes place. Having the idea of a baptism works in favor of avoiding various counterintuitive outcomes of the description theory and is evident in Kripke’s example of a man named Gödel. Referring to Gödel as “the man who proved the incompleteness theorem” and then learning in the future that Gödel plagiarized proof from Schmidt, means that using the name Gödel would be referring to Schmidt according to the descriptive theory. However, our instincts tell us that we are referring to Gödel. Kripke says, “it does not seem that if most of the ϕ’s are satisfied by a unique object γ, then γ is the referent of the name. This seems simply to be false.” (Kripke, Naming and Necessity). The causal theory proves to have clear advantages. In his Causal Theory of Names, Evans recognizes that Kripke’s theory has its benefits, but still feels that unamended it is not accurate. A crucial problem he has with the theory deals with Kripke’s initial baptism and that it’s unapparent which devices are being used when something is initially being denoted. The most description that Kripke gives about initial baptism’s is that, “When the name is 'passed from link to link,' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it." The issue Evans sees with this is that despite how vague or far-flung the causal relationship between a person’s use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, when the person uses the name they are still going to be referring to that object. Evidently it appears that the theory has no regards for context and so Evans likes to suggest it as a magic trick. “The capacity to denote something” has been passed on somehow and since its been passed on, there’s no way for it to ever be lost. Another concern of Evans about the causal theory, in the category of surrounding context, is that it does not fully justify the difference believing and denoting. There can be situations where a person may use a name and say something about the name that is true, and no causal chain from the person’s use of the term to the terms initial baptism will exist. An example would be a person who knows the method behind naming U.S. city streets, in that they are named numerically and chronologically. …show more content…
So it appears the main problem for the causal theory begins at a names initial baptism because once it’s given a reference, in the future, causally disseminated uses of the name will unavoidably be referring back to the reference given at the initial baptism. Regardless if the name in the future is widely accepted as referring to something else. That being said, I think that Evan’s criticism is successful if the causal theory is unamended, because instances of reference change are critical to