When the Army is restricted from employing the latest and greatest technology on the battlefield, it is usually because of the cost of the item or the time it would take to procure and distribute new equipment. Sometimes, lack of interest in a useful piece of equipment will prevent it from being funded and used. Prior to the Korean War, none of these three restrictions served as the obstacle that blocked the Army from maximizing the potential for aviation assets, even as incredible technological advancements were made and high interest was shown and funded. Legislation proved to be the major factor that prevented the Army from developing, procuring, and distributing the very technology that would prove to be essential in Army operations
…show more content…
The integration of rotary wing assets into the ground force’s overall plan was not always as seamless as it is today. During the Korean War, the helicopter was a relatively new piece of technology that had not been used to its full potential, but gained popularity and credibility across multiple branches of service. Several key pieces of legislation dictated how the Army could utilize aviation assets during the Korean War, despite the needs of the ground force. Inter-service rivalry between a newly created Air Force and the Army, as well as inconsistencies between different pieces of legislation limited the Army’s ability to maximize the use of rotary wing assets. However, ambiguous language within the legislation and the development of Air Force roles created opportunity for creative Army leaders to incorporate aviation assets across the wide spectrum of Army …show more content…
Because of their relation to one another, President Truman was adamant about signing the two pieces of legislation on the same day, so time constraints did not allow for the authors to compare them side-by-side. This haste allowed for two inconsistent documents to be signed into law. Inconsistencies included overlapping functions, which would cause more friction between the services. Additionally, the order specified that the Air Force would train forces to carry out seven tasks, in order of precedence. Interestingly, “supporting land forces” was second to last on that list, even though General Spaatz had assigned that responsibility to an entire
The integration of rotary wing assets into the ground force’s overall plan was not always as seamless as it is today. During the Korean War, the helicopter was a relatively new piece of technology that had not been used to its full potential, but gained popularity and credibility across multiple branches of service. Several key pieces of legislation dictated how the Army could utilize aviation assets during the Korean War, despite the needs of the ground force. Inter-service rivalry between a newly created Air Force and the Army, as well as inconsistencies between different pieces of legislation limited the Army’s ability to maximize the use of rotary wing assets. However, ambiguous language within the legislation and the development of Air Force roles created opportunity for creative Army leaders to incorporate aviation assets across the wide spectrum of Army …show more content…
Because of their relation to one another, President Truman was adamant about signing the two pieces of legislation on the same day, so time constraints did not allow for the authors to compare them side-by-side. This haste allowed for two inconsistent documents to be signed into law. Inconsistencies included overlapping functions, which would cause more friction between the services. Additionally, the order specified that the Air Force would train forces to carry out seven tasks, in order of precedence. Interestingly, “supporting land forces” was second to last on that list, even though General Spaatz had assigned that responsibility to an entire