There had been continual modest economic reforms under Khrushchev, although they never went far enough toward solving the problem. Khrushchev’s reforms focused around agriculture and production, and were impatiently implemented, unfortunately for him failing and causing a decline in production (Malia, 331). Once he was removed, and many Five Year Plans had failed, Brezhnev’s goals turned toward maintaining the Soviet Union against revolt. Opportunities were consistently missed in the 24th party congress, and deterioration began. Many initial reforms ground to a halt and eventually, Brezhnev too focused on agriculture, and as stated spent upwards of 25% of the budget on this focus. Production did not increase, and “one reason for this relative failure was that Soviet agriculture had been so depressed that even rapid growth could not raise the level of production very much.” (Malia, 357) After this, food supply declined and agriculture became a burden on society. Growth rates of both national product and worker productivity were trending down, eventually proved lower than both Soviet and CIA estimates, eventually heading into negative growth. The Soviet economy had been industrially behind so consistently that missing the “great turn from extensive to intensive development” in the 1960’s and 70’s proved to be an incredible mistake. (Malia, 363) The technology gap between the USSR and the West was also increasing more year after year, making it perpetually harder for the Soviet Union to keep up with the Western World. The economic model was rooted in Stalin’s ‘war communism’ with everything under the control of the party, and specifically one leader. Making change to this, even attempting to move toward a market system proved exceeding difficult for both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Many in leadership were unable to realize the scope of the economic deterioration, often due to distraction by the countries natural
There had been continual modest economic reforms under Khrushchev, although they never went far enough toward solving the problem. Khrushchev’s reforms focused around agriculture and production, and were impatiently implemented, unfortunately for him failing and causing a decline in production (Malia, 331). Once he was removed, and many Five Year Plans had failed, Brezhnev’s goals turned toward maintaining the Soviet Union against revolt. Opportunities were consistently missed in the 24th party congress, and deterioration began. Many initial reforms ground to a halt and eventually, Brezhnev too focused on agriculture, and as stated spent upwards of 25% of the budget on this focus. Production did not increase, and “one reason for this relative failure was that Soviet agriculture had been so depressed that even rapid growth could not raise the level of production very much.” (Malia, 357) After this, food supply declined and agriculture became a burden on society. Growth rates of both national product and worker productivity were trending down, eventually proved lower than both Soviet and CIA estimates, eventually heading into negative growth. The Soviet economy had been industrially behind so consistently that missing the “great turn from extensive to intensive development” in the 1960’s and 70’s proved to be an incredible mistake. (Malia, 363) The technology gap between the USSR and the West was also increasing more year after year, making it perpetually harder for the Soviet Union to keep up with the Western World. The economic model was rooted in Stalin’s ‘war communism’ with everything under the control of the party, and specifically one leader. Making change to this, even attempting to move toward a market system proved exceeding difficult for both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Many in leadership were unable to realize the scope of the economic deterioration, often due to distraction by the countries natural