Kantian Revolution Summary

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In what follows, we will commit ourselves to answering several questions that arise in the first reading of this excerpt. Is Moore’s reading of Copernican Revolution correct? Is Epistemology really a product of Kantian revolution? What are, if there are any, epistemological questions? We will also attempt to locate Moore’s argument — or rather arguments of similar kind — in the context of contemporary debate between Realists and anti-Realists. Our aim will be to show that what Moore speaks against is not so much a particular notion of truth, but rather the whole philosophical perspective. Before we attempt to answer those questions, however, a short preliminary comment is in order. Theses stated in the first sentence of the citation stems …show more content…
Is Moore’s reading of Copernican Revolution correct? Is Epistemology really a product of Kantian revolution? What are, if there are any, epistemological questions? We will also attempt to locate Moore’s argument — or rather arguments of similar kind — in the context of contemporary debate between Realists and anti-Realists. Our aim will be to show that what Moore speaks against is not so much a particular notion of truth, but rather the whole philosophical …show more content…
Theses stated in the first sentence of the citation stems from the view which has come to be regarded as traditional in philosophy, namely that the notion of truth is independent of human ways of conceptualizing. First philosopher to elucidate the untenable consequences of this traditional belief was Immanuel Kant. By doing so, he laid the foundations of the contemporary debate between Realists and anti-Realists, to which we will come back at the end of this paper. Let us now return to the first question. What is ‘Copernican Revolution’ according to Moore? The (false) assertion which he suggests be fundamental to Kantian project is that ‘to be true’ means to be thought in a certain way. While we are not given sufficient criterion of correctness, it is reasonable to assume that what Moore finds unacceptable is the contingency and relativity of truth that would, according to him, follow from Kantian understating of this notion. Under closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the assertion Moore finds disquieting is by no means Kantian

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