Justifying the Punishment of a Criminal Offender
For decades, the debate on the justification of legal punishment has troubled scholars. The paper, “The Justification of General Deterrence,” written by Daniel M. Farrell adds to this debate by offering a unique take on the justification of punishment. In the paper, Farrell conceives the justification of punishment as “weakly retributivistic” –a balance between the radical form of retributivism and a forward-looking notion of punishment. Farrell, like Jeffrie G. Murphy (1979), believes that one of the main difficulties that we come across when trying to justify punishment is explaining by what right we use wrongdoers to prevent others from perpetrating crimes in the future. Farrell fails to accept …show more content…
In other words, this paper supports a non-radical or weak retributivistic justification of punishment, but it does not believe that an argument based on societal self-defense is reasonable. At the same time, this paper considers that the argument of self-defense brought by Farrell is rather enlightening. It urges us to focus on the criminal offender’s choice at a particular moment in time and the wrong that has already taken place as a result of the offender’s choice. Perhaps a more reasonable version of mild retributivism can be understood in terms of restitution –as many critics have proposed– for the damage caused by the offender. A mild retributivistic justification of punishment based on restitution seems more likely since it is only logical and morally correct that any compensation goes (belongs) to the victims of …show more content…
Imagine Martha assaults Kate, and Kate suspects that Martha is going to assault her again unless some sort of punishment or pain is inflicted on Martha, then Kate is within her rights to choose Martha as the sufferer (otherwise Kate will be the sufferer). This is considered indirect self-defense, according to Farrell. Unfortunately, the logic of indirect self-defense –as is used by Farrell– is problematic. Indirect self-defense seems to be a reasonable justification only in some cases –e.g. multiple DUIs. In cases like this, where the offender is a recidivist, it is okay to assume that the crime is more likely to happen again. Therefore, it is in society’s best interest to punish the offender now in order to stop recidivism and promote a special
For decades, the debate on the justification of legal punishment has troubled scholars. The paper, “The Justification of General Deterrence,” written by Daniel M. Farrell adds to this debate by offering a unique take on the justification of punishment. In the paper, Farrell conceives the justification of punishment as “weakly retributivistic” –a balance between the radical form of retributivism and a forward-looking notion of punishment. Farrell, like Jeffrie G. Murphy (1979), believes that one of the main difficulties that we come across when trying to justify punishment is explaining by what right we use wrongdoers to prevent others from perpetrating crimes in the future. Farrell fails to accept …show more content…
In other words, this paper supports a non-radical or weak retributivistic justification of punishment, but it does not believe that an argument based on societal self-defense is reasonable. At the same time, this paper considers that the argument of self-defense brought by Farrell is rather enlightening. It urges us to focus on the criminal offender’s choice at a particular moment in time and the wrong that has already taken place as a result of the offender’s choice. Perhaps a more reasonable version of mild retributivism can be understood in terms of restitution –as many critics have proposed– for the damage caused by the offender. A mild retributivistic justification of punishment based on restitution seems more likely since it is only logical and morally correct that any compensation goes (belongs) to the victims of …show more content…
Imagine Martha assaults Kate, and Kate suspects that Martha is going to assault her again unless some sort of punishment or pain is inflicted on Martha, then Kate is within her rights to choose Martha as the sufferer (otherwise Kate will be the sufferer). This is considered indirect self-defense, according to Farrell. Unfortunately, the logic of indirect self-defense –as is used by Farrell– is problematic. Indirect self-defense seems to be a reasonable justification only in some cases –e.g. multiple DUIs. In cases like this, where the offender is a recidivist, it is okay to assume that the crime is more likely to happen again. Therefore, it is in society’s best interest to punish the offender now in order to stop recidivism and promote a special