Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) is a case whereby a catholic church Monsignor allegedly molested two teenage boys between 1970s and early 1980s, luring them with clothes, meals, and money in exchange for sexual benefits. The victims, now in their late 50’s, decided to sue the archdiocese in 2014. The following recitation regarding facts of the case involving Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) are drawn from the first operative amendment complaint (FAC). First, Plaintiff Juan HJ Doe (J. Doe) is believed to have been born between 1962 or 1963 while the second Plaintiff Juan HL Doe (L. Doe) is believed to have been born in 1964. As such, Monsignor Benjamin is accused of sexually abusing J. Doe between1976-1981. …show more content…
According to the complainants, the accused used to lure plaintiffs using clothes, lavish meals, entertainment whereby he paid for expensive trips, educated them in private schools and also gave thousands of dollars. Evidently, Hawkes believed that by paying them money and giving them other lavish materials, he owned the complainants. Essentially, he communicated to them that his actions of giving them money was as a way of paying for the sexual abuse that he was committing upon them. Hawkes committed the offence of sexual abuse while he was running the defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (the Archdiocese). He was doing all this because the United States attorney gave him ‘full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite, necessary or appropriate to be done’, authority that enabled him to perform any activity. As such, the law enabled Hawkes control all financial affairs of the archdiocese for personal gain. For this reason, in 1996, J. Doe wrote to the archdiocese and reported the assault that they had at the hands of Hawkes. Resultantly, they were compensated for the psychological counseling that they underwent. However, in the year 2014, J. Doe and L. Doe retained a lawyer to …show more content…
(Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1341 (Gilkyson); Code Civ. Proc., §§ 312 & 350.) The U.S constitution fixes that period to give plaintiff adequate time to have resources to sue against the wellbeing “‘promoting the diligent assertion of the claim, ensuring defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and providing repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed.’” (Gilkyson, at p. 1341, quoting Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191.). The period time starts when an assault is committed to the complainant. ” (Gilkyson, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) Nonetheless, if the time between the occurrence of the assault and the exact date that the plaintiff files the suit is much greater than the period prescribed by the constitution, then the plaintiff’s claim would be barred unless they have proof that the running period was tolled. Therefore, when analyzing this case, we ought to consider if plaintiff’s reporting time is under the U.S prescribed period; if not, was the period tolled or the expired claims revived. That’s when their claims will be heard in the court of