G. John Ikenberry notes that maintaining order within a system of sovereign states has been, and remains, a fundamental of problem international relations. The recurrence of ever-evolving organizing principles demonstrates the various ways in which states attempt to solve the dilemma. Although dominating or retreating from the international system presents states with options for consolidating short-term gains, transforming the system offers dominant states an opportunity to secure long-term advantage. Previous attempts to create enduring order – such as the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Concert of Europe (1815), and Treaty of Versailles (1919) – emphasized principles of cooperation to maintain security. A recent
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In addition to basic claims about an anarchic system characterized by uncertainty and where states seek to balance power, Mearsheimer makes assumptions about states’ offensive military capabilities and motivation for survival. His assumptions lead to three observed patterns of behavior where states fear each other, seek to guarantee their own survival, and maximize relative power over others. Although Mearsheimer’s claims apply to all states, his descriptions seem to imply behavior of a dominant state or hegemon concerned with the emergence of a potential rival. Regardless, he fails to recognize the compatibility of his assumptions and observed behaviors with …show more content…
Great powers form concerts after major war because they have little to gain by attacking each other, have an interest in maintaining the status quo, desire to avoid another war, and wish to extend wartime collective action into peacetime. These factors might explain the emergence of institutionalism following World War II, and its acceleration after the Cold War. The United States had little to gain from attacking the Soviet Union, had an interest in maintaining a status quo defined by its economic and military dominance, sought to avoid future global or nuclear war, and desired to integrate newly emerging states into a system of democratic peace and economic interdependence. Despite Mearsheimer’s pessimism about the prospect for cooperation, small, weak states conceded to this arrangement. Though logical from the United States’ perspective, Stone highlights a key puzzle – why would weak states join these
In addition to basic claims about an anarchic system characterized by uncertainty and where states seek to balance power, Mearsheimer makes assumptions about states’ offensive military capabilities and motivation for survival. His assumptions lead to three observed patterns of behavior where states fear each other, seek to guarantee their own survival, and maximize relative power over others. Although Mearsheimer’s claims apply to all states, his descriptions seem to imply behavior of a dominant state or hegemon concerned with the emergence of a potential rival. Regardless, he fails to recognize the compatibility of his assumptions and observed behaviors with …show more content…
Great powers form concerts after major war because they have little to gain by attacking each other, have an interest in maintaining the status quo, desire to avoid another war, and wish to extend wartime collective action into peacetime. These factors might explain the emergence of institutionalism following World War II, and its acceleration after the Cold War. The United States had little to gain from attacking the Soviet Union, had an interest in maintaining a status quo defined by its economic and military dominance, sought to avoid future global or nuclear war, and desired to integrate newly emerging states into a system of democratic peace and economic interdependence. Despite Mearsheimer’s pessimism about the prospect for cooperation, small, weak states conceded to this arrangement. Though logical from the United States’ perspective, Stone highlights a key puzzle – why would weak states join these