Even liberal theories, however, seem to appeal to affective relationships to an extent, and “call on us to show at least minimal care for others” (76). He argues that the liberal concern about the status of strangers is unfounded, and that caring equally about everyone is consistent with affording greater care to people one knows immediately. Radical egalitarianism does not advocate “equal relations of care,” but rather a social order where we do not discriminate strongly between “groups of strangers, in particular those with whom we are culturally or politically affiliated and those with whom we are not” (77). In Baker's view, solidarity and other affective relationships are fundamental for equality and societal change
Even liberal theories, however, seem to appeal to affective relationships to an extent, and “call on us to show at least minimal care for others” (76). He argues that the liberal concern about the status of strangers is unfounded, and that caring equally about everyone is consistent with affording greater care to people one knows immediately. Radical egalitarianism does not advocate “equal relations of care,” but rather a social order where we do not discriminate strongly between “groups of strangers, in particular those with whom we are culturally or politically affiliated and those with whom we are not” (77). In Baker's view, solidarity and other affective relationships are fundamental for equality and societal change