The U.S. should cease IMET in the Middle East because the differences in national priorities and abilities between the U.S. and its foreign counterparts make the training environment far from ideal. In situations like the Middle East, the stage is no longer set for the U.S. to enforce its policy, and its goals cannot be met according to plan.12 The failures of U.S.-trained Iraqi, Afghan, and Syrian forces reveal similar problems across the region. On the surface, Americans may attribute these problems to poor leadership, a lack of motivation, and an inability to fight effectively without advanced intelligence and logistical support.13 Regarding the lack of motivation, the troops do not see their regimes as worth sacrificing their lives for.14 In some cases, their own government is more of a threat to security than the Islamic State, changing the order of national priorities and the identity of the opposition.15 Differences in culture and education further stagnate any aptitude for growth from training. U.S. military trainers have observed that the starting point for a local fighter is decades behind compared to an American recruit.16 In addition to obvious language barriers, foreign recruits required “time-consuming literacy training so they could read the serial numbers on their weapons, or lessons on proper hygiene to prevent illnesses that would reduce their effectiveness in combat,” according to American training officers quoted in the NY Times.17 No amount of training can make up these differences at the basic level of culture and education. These inconsistencies support the argument for cessation of IMET operations in the Middle East because they create an environment incapable of cultivating the goals of the
The U.S. should cease IMET in the Middle East because the differences in national priorities and abilities between the U.S. and its foreign counterparts make the training environment far from ideal. In situations like the Middle East, the stage is no longer set for the U.S. to enforce its policy, and its goals cannot be met according to plan.12 The failures of U.S.-trained Iraqi, Afghan, and Syrian forces reveal similar problems across the region. On the surface, Americans may attribute these problems to poor leadership, a lack of motivation, and an inability to fight effectively without advanced intelligence and logistical support.13 Regarding the lack of motivation, the troops do not see their regimes as worth sacrificing their lives for.14 In some cases, their own government is more of a threat to security than the Islamic State, changing the order of national priorities and the identity of the opposition.15 Differences in culture and education further stagnate any aptitude for growth from training. U.S. military trainers have observed that the starting point for a local fighter is decades behind compared to an American recruit.16 In addition to obvious language barriers, foreign recruits required “time-consuming literacy training so they could read the serial numbers on their weapons, or lessons on proper hygiene to prevent illnesses that would reduce their effectiveness in combat,” according to American training officers quoted in the NY Times.17 No amount of training can make up these differences at the basic level of culture and education. These inconsistencies support the argument for cessation of IMET operations in the Middle East because they create an environment incapable of cultivating the goals of the