Introduction
Strong representationalism (SR) is the view that intentionality alone is sufficient in defining the characteristics of sensory experiences (qualia). Intentionality in this case is understood as representation, of which can exhibit functional or physical properties. Sensory experiences must thus always be about something for SR, regardless of the subject’s awareness of it. As opposed to the traditional understanding of qualia, SR rejects the idea that mental states possess an intrinsically qualitative aspect. Instead, strong representationalists identify qualia “as phenomenal character […] with representational properties.”
Arguments in support of SR include ones regarding materialism, transparency and veracity. I will briefly review …show more content…
SR for some, is a way to explain such discrepancies. For if an experience fails to correspond with the truth, it is merely misrepresenting the object in question. Weak representationalism (who grant both intentional and qualitative contents to mental states) however, can also account for veracity, which makes the argument ineffectual in proving SR.
Arguments for SR: Materialism
A materialist will be more inclined to accept SR, since it provides a simple solution to the problem of having to explain immaterial objects, such as the qualitative aspect of qualia. SR maintains however, that mental states are purely intentional and not qualitative, which reinforces its compatibilism with materialism.
The obvious objection against this argument is that it commits the fallacy of question begging. That is, it assumes materialism to already be true. To be fair, it is too strong of a claim to say that this argument proves SR. Rather, it merely shows the incentives to accept SR for those who are already proponents of physicalism. When evaluated purely as an argument for the validity of SR however, it fails to deliver.
Arguments for SR: …show more content…
For example, when a visually impaired person reads a book, the letters are on the pages will appear blurry, despite it not being the case in actuality. It is moreover proof that besides the object itself, the capacity of our faculties to perceive it is also a deciding factor of the final experience we receive. For SR however, these additional qualia would simply be another “visual representa”. In other words, even if the sensory experience did not originate from the object (for SR is not concerned with the source of the experience), it is still intentional (in the case of the example, it is about the blurriness). Thus, like the materialism argument, the validity of the transparency argument is not necessary to establish SR. In addition, as long as supporters of SR can find intentional content within the counterexamples raised, then SR
Strong representationalism (SR) is the view that intentionality alone is sufficient in defining the characteristics of sensory experiences (qualia). Intentionality in this case is understood as representation, of which can exhibit functional or physical properties. Sensory experiences must thus always be about something for SR, regardless of the subject’s awareness of it. As opposed to the traditional understanding of qualia, SR rejects the idea that mental states possess an intrinsically qualitative aspect. Instead, strong representationalists identify qualia “as phenomenal character […] with representational properties.”
Arguments in support of SR include ones regarding materialism, transparency and veracity. I will briefly review …show more content…
SR for some, is a way to explain such discrepancies. For if an experience fails to correspond with the truth, it is merely misrepresenting the object in question. Weak representationalism (who grant both intentional and qualitative contents to mental states) however, can also account for veracity, which makes the argument ineffectual in proving SR.
Arguments for SR: Materialism
A materialist will be more inclined to accept SR, since it provides a simple solution to the problem of having to explain immaterial objects, such as the qualitative aspect of qualia. SR maintains however, that mental states are purely intentional and not qualitative, which reinforces its compatibilism with materialism.
The obvious objection against this argument is that it commits the fallacy of question begging. That is, it assumes materialism to already be true. To be fair, it is too strong of a claim to say that this argument proves SR. Rather, it merely shows the incentives to accept SR for those who are already proponents of physicalism. When evaluated purely as an argument for the validity of SR however, it fails to deliver.
Arguments for SR: …show more content…
For example, when a visually impaired person reads a book, the letters are on the pages will appear blurry, despite it not being the case in actuality. It is moreover proof that besides the object itself, the capacity of our faculties to perceive it is also a deciding factor of the final experience we receive. For SR however, these additional qualia would simply be another “visual representa”. In other words, even if the sensory experience did not originate from the object (for SR is not concerned with the source of the experience), it is still intentional (in the case of the example, it is about the blurriness). Thus, like the materialism argument, the validity of the transparency argument is not necessary to establish SR. In addition, as long as supporters of SR can find intentional content within the counterexamples raised, then SR