Intelligence support for Information Operations is not decidedly different from “normal” intelligence, as described in Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, as knowledge of the adversary, however the is a difference in the perception of intelligence during peacetime military exercises versus armed military conflicts. Intelligence is collected and processed everyday through the intelligence cycle, but the natural tendency to focus and prioritize intelligence processing based on the current or most conspicuous adversarial crisis. Adding to the intelligence bias for the most pressing issue, are the biases from senior leaders who have entrenched views of adversaries based on cold war doctrine of closed societies.
The Joint Vision 2010 for U.S. military operations is succinct in that information superiority against an adversary is key and here in lies a substantial crux of the issue intelligence support for Information Operations; the necessity for adversarial conflict and what course of action to follow without a national adversary. If the calculus must contain at least adversary to achieve the mission’s goal for military commanders, then without a defined adversary; there is a likely trend for commanders to find one with known familiarity or use the wrong lens to evaluate other less …show more content…
Information Operations is the normal intelligence, not new but rather new perspectives on how to view and interpret the information. Potentially, the newest analysts joining the ranks within the Intelligence Community, regardless of age, bring thought processes not conformed to traditional military or government norms, but rather the opportunities of to explore the environment of
The Joint Vision 2010 for U.S. military operations is succinct in that information superiority against an adversary is key and here in lies a substantial crux of the issue intelligence support for Information Operations; the necessity for adversarial conflict and what course of action to follow without a national adversary. If the calculus must contain at least adversary to achieve the mission’s goal for military commanders, then without a defined adversary; there is a likely trend for commanders to find one with known familiarity or use the wrong lens to evaluate other less …show more content…
Information Operations is the normal intelligence, not new but rather new perspectives on how to view and interpret the information. Potentially, the newest analysts joining the ranks within the Intelligence Community, regardless of age, bring thought processes not conformed to traditional military or government norms, but rather the opportunities of to explore the environment of