Accepting intelligence failures are inevitable is a pessimistic approach and does very little to help in preventing future failures or surprise attacks. The notion that intelligence failure are ( richard betts) inevitable is based on past studies of notable surprise attacks against the U.S, such as Pearl Harbour and 9/11.Therefore, it would be unwise and unjust to compare past intelligence failure to the present, due to the ever changing nature of threats. However, the challenges are very different in today's world. The different challenges faced by today’s intelligence community against terrorist surprise attacks are qualitatively different and this essay argues that the intelligence community can succeed and surprise attacks can be prevented
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According to (The 9/11 commission Report, 2004) information was not shared , sometimes inadvertently, because of legal misunderstanding and often the information was lost in the divide between foreign and domestic agencies of the government. For instance, the CIA had the passport copy of Mihdhar containing multiple-entry visa for U.S and his visa application, was faxed from American embassy in jeddah, Saudi Arabia to CIA’s Alec station, showed Mihdhar’s destination New York. This was later reported in the finding of 9/11 commission report, May 2001: a CIA official does not notify the FBI about Mihdhar’s U.S visa, Hazmi’s U.S travel, or Khallad’s having attended the kuala lumpur meeting( identified when he reviewed all of the relevant traffic because of high level of threat) (9/11 commission report, 2004, p. 355). Similarly, (Zegart, 2006) describes intelligence agencies were so disconnected before 9/11 that the CIA’s announcement of war against Osama Bin Laden in 1998 never went outside of CIA’s walls. This “organizational stovepipe” was also evident in NSA’s coordination with other agencies. In late 1999 NSA analysed the communication between Khalid, Nawaf and Salem and correctly concluded Nawaf and Khalid might be a part of an terrorist operational cadre and something big might be on, but waited to be asked by other agencies(9/11 commission report, 2004, p. …show more content…
There was lack of communication between FBI and national security council, and other national security agencies. The FBI director would not communicate with the President directly and was virtually non existent, especially during whole Clinton administration (9/11 commission report, 2004, p.
According to (The 9/11 commission Report, 2004) information was not shared , sometimes inadvertently, because of legal misunderstanding and often the information was lost in the divide between foreign and domestic agencies of the government. For instance, the CIA had the passport copy of Mihdhar containing multiple-entry visa for U.S and his visa application, was faxed from American embassy in jeddah, Saudi Arabia to CIA’s Alec station, showed Mihdhar’s destination New York. This was later reported in the finding of 9/11 commission report, May 2001: a CIA official does not notify the FBI about Mihdhar’s U.S visa, Hazmi’s U.S travel, or Khallad’s having attended the kuala lumpur meeting( identified when he reviewed all of the relevant traffic because of high level of threat) (9/11 commission report, 2004, p. 355). Similarly, (Zegart, 2006) describes intelligence agencies were so disconnected before 9/11 that the CIA’s announcement of war against Osama Bin Laden in 1998 never went outside of CIA’s walls. This “organizational stovepipe” was also evident in NSA’s coordination with other agencies. In late 1999 NSA analysed the communication between Khalid, Nawaf and Salem and correctly concluded Nawaf and Khalid might be a part of an terrorist operational cadre and something big might be on, but waited to be asked by other agencies(9/11 commission report, 2004, p. …show more content…
There was lack of communication between FBI and national security council, and other national security agencies. The FBI director would not communicate with the President directly and was virtually non existent, especially during whole Clinton administration (9/11 commission report, 2004, p.