Moreover, when participants rated utilitarianism as less morally acceptable, the amygdala was in a state overdrive according to the fMRI (Greene & Shenhav, 2014). Thus, raises the question of whether or not the decisions being made can mirror real life application. It almost seems that there is, no matter what, some element of emotion and that can change decisions rather quickly. Appiah may claim that “our responses to imaginary scenarios mirror our responses to real ones” (Appiah, 2008). Only referring to the above study, I’d argue this with Appiah. There is no concrete way or system to make such a profound statement. Both experimental psychology and philosophy cannot count for the possibly of fabricated responses or emotions. The thought outcome an individual may have can be different than what they act upon. In the discussion of the study Greene noted, “. . . intuitions about what to do in the imaginary case is explained by the activation of the very mechanism that would lead us to act in a real one” (Greene & Shenhav, 2014). There was a slight rebuttal from Appiah, although not directed towards Greene, “Well, without that assumption, your explanation of why we respond as we do fails” (Appiah, 2008). Appiah literally contradicts himself this way. There is another study mentioned in this paper, however, the support for Appiah is still
Moreover, when participants rated utilitarianism as less morally acceptable, the amygdala was in a state overdrive according to the fMRI (Greene & Shenhav, 2014). Thus, raises the question of whether or not the decisions being made can mirror real life application. It almost seems that there is, no matter what, some element of emotion and that can change decisions rather quickly. Appiah may claim that “our responses to imaginary scenarios mirror our responses to real ones” (Appiah, 2008). Only referring to the above study, I’d argue this with Appiah. There is no concrete way or system to make such a profound statement. Both experimental psychology and philosophy cannot count for the possibly of fabricated responses or emotions. The thought outcome an individual may have can be different than what they act upon. In the discussion of the study Greene noted, “. . . intuitions about what to do in the imaginary case is explained by the activation of the very mechanism that would lead us to act in a real one” (Greene & Shenhav, 2014). There was a slight rebuttal from Appiah, although not directed towards Greene, “Well, without that assumption, your explanation of why we respond as we do fails” (Appiah, 2008). Appiah literally contradicts himself this way. There is another study mentioned in this paper, however, the support for Appiah is still