What kind of expeditionary operations are most important?
First of all, people may wonder, why asking this question?
This obviously suggests evaluations on expeditionary operations in Australia’s defence context, i.e., what kind of such operations will make the most of the limited resources and budget to present the best performance for achieving their objectives---securing Australia’s wider interests. In other words, “most important” means most cost-effective; and this does not only indicate money and success but more importantly, associates with risks and lives. This is why after war in Afghanistan and Iraq, “having boots on the ground” nearly becomes taboo for the U.S. and its allies, such as Australia.
Then, how we frame the whole …show more content…
In terms of partners, due to the region’s remoteness to the western strategic interests, the military involvement from our alliance, the U.S., cannot be guaranteed except for technology and intelligence. Therefore, if under the request from the local authority or under UN’s sanction, Australia should be prepared to lead such expeditionary operations on its own or in coalition with the regional countries like New Zealand and Indonesia.
Although such missions have substantive importance, the objectives still have their boundaries. But limited roles do not indicate turning the force into a constabulary (HW). Amphibious force structure with conventional combat power is still indispensable as it is never surprise that the local power will view any foreign force as an act of intervention or even invasion. Thus what a formal army can do for contributing to stability and supporting governance is limited, and that is what we should admit rather than trying to solve except inviting other specialized NGO to join for …show more content…
The continent-expeditionary debate is the epitome of Australia’s continent ethos and sea insecurity. In other words, geopolitics still dominates Australia’s defence policy making even though the changes brought by the globalization and Asia’s rising are recognized. Therefore the level of Australia’s commitment to expeditionary campaigns and the way to conduct them largely depends on geographic distance and the role of its major ally- the U.S. will play in those missions. Based on these judgements, it suggests that an operation of necessity, an operation of strategy and an operation of choice are most important when protecting Australia’s interests in its immediate neighbourhood, in the Asia(Indo)-Pacific region and in the global theatre respectively. And even though the increasing importance of Asia(Indo)-Pacific region requires a maritime oriented outlook, given the increasing power of Asia countries, Australia should keep defining its position as a middle power with limited strategic objectives and capability. Therefore, Australia’s strategic thinking dominated by its continent ethos will still be qualified to serve its interests in the near
First of all, people may wonder, why asking this question?
This obviously suggests evaluations on expeditionary operations in Australia’s defence context, i.e., what kind of such operations will make the most of the limited resources and budget to present the best performance for achieving their objectives---securing Australia’s wider interests. In other words, “most important” means most cost-effective; and this does not only indicate money and success but more importantly, associates with risks and lives. This is why after war in Afghanistan and Iraq, “having boots on the ground” nearly becomes taboo for the U.S. and its allies, such as Australia.
Then, how we frame the whole …show more content…
In terms of partners, due to the region’s remoteness to the western strategic interests, the military involvement from our alliance, the U.S., cannot be guaranteed except for technology and intelligence. Therefore, if under the request from the local authority or under UN’s sanction, Australia should be prepared to lead such expeditionary operations on its own or in coalition with the regional countries like New Zealand and Indonesia.
Although such missions have substantive importance, the objectives still have their boundaries. But limited roles do not indicate turning the force into a constabulary (HW). Amphibious force structure with conventional combat power is still indispensable as it is never surprise that the local power will view any foreign force as an act of intervention or even invasion. Thus what a formal army can do for contributing to stability and supporting governance is limited, and that is what we should admit rather than trying to solve except inviting other specialized NGO to join for …show more content…
The continent-expeditionary debate is the epitome of Australia’s continent ethos and sea insecurity. In other words, geopolitics still dominates Australia’s defence policy making even though the changes brought by the globalization and Asia’s rising are recognized. Therefore the level of Australia’s commitment to expeditionary campaigns and the way to conduct them largely depends on geographic distance and the role of its major ally- the U.S. will play in those missions. Based on these judgements, it suggests that an operation of necessity, an operation of strategy and an operation of choice are most important when protecting Australia’s interests in its immediate neighbourhood, in the Asia(Indo)-Pacific region and in the global theatre respectively. And even though the increasing importance of Asia(Indo)-Pacific region requires a maritime oriented outlook, given the increasing power of Asia countries, Australia should keep defining its position as a middle power with limited strategic objectives and capability. Therefore, Australia’s strategic thinking dominated by its continent ethos will still be qualified to serve its interests in the near