Essentially, humans and non-human animals are the same. Each having a life cycle, each possessing the ability to construct homes, each having a form of communication, can feel pain, are intelligent and have a sense of community. These are just some of the traits that humans and non-human animals share. Yet, despite these similarities, as human beings, we dissociate ourselves from our own nature. Thinking that we are “higher” in status, and yes, human beings have evolved, but humans have not transcended animal status. Furthermore, there are no good arguments for why it is permissible to use non-human animals, but not human beings in medical research. Now, doctor Ezekiel Emanuel once stated that there are seven requirements for what makes clinical
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While Singer acknowledges the fact that there are differences between humans and non-human animals, he argues that these differences should not exclude animals from equal consideration. In fact, the principle of equality should be extended to animals. As a principle, equality implies “that our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess – what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do” (Singer, 1974, 4). In other words, while the principle of equality should be extended to non-human animals, differences between humans and non-human animals may lead to different rights. However, despite the fact that animals are different, what solidifies non-human animals place in equal consideration, according to Singer, is having the capacity to suffer. Suffering, which Singer views as “a prerequisite for having interests at all” (Singer, 1974, 4). Now, the reason I employ Singer’s position here instead of earlier in the paper is because the principle of equality is not a theory for grounding moral status. Furthermore, Singer’s application of the principle of equality to animals exemplifies that the moral sphere need not focus exclusively on human
While Singer acknowledges the fact that there are differences between humans and non-human animals, he argues that these differences should not exclude animals from equal consideration. In fact, the principle of equality should be extended to animals. As a principle, equality implies “that our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess – what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do” (Singer, 1974, 4). In other words, while the principle of equality should be extended to non-human animals, differences between humans and non-human animals may lead to different rights. However, despite the fact that animals are different, what solidifies non-human animals place in equal consideration, according to Singer, is having the capacity to suffer. Suffering, which Singer views as “a prerequisite for having interests at all” (Singer, 1974, 4). Now, the reason I employ Singer’s position here instead of earlier in the paper is because the principle of equality is not a theory for grounding moral status. Furthermore, Singer’s application of the principle of equality to animals exemplifies that the moral sphere need not focus exclusively on human