After Tet, the majority of officials in Johnson's administration, most notably Clark Clifford, began to question the U.S goal to maintain a noncommunist government in Vietnam in a reasonable time frame and at acceptable costs. As Clifford had stated ''the thrust which was that we should not continue to pour blood and treasure into Vietnam'', therefore the Tet Offensive had demonstrated to the senior officials that U.S. could not win a limited war of attrition in Vietnam, and concluded to the the change in policy was
After Tet, the majority of officials in Johnson's administration, most notably Clark Clifford, began to question the U.S goal to maintain a noncommunist government in Vietnam in a reasonable time frame and at acceptable costs. As Clifford had stated ''the thrust which was that we should not continue to pour blood and treasure into Vietnam'', therefore the Tet Offensive had demonstrated to the senior officials that U.S. could not win a limited war of attrition in Vietnam, and concluded to the the change in policy was