As the relationship between the Middle East and the West becomes more bleak, Khomeini and Bin Laden in the world of geopolitics, share similarities in their philosophical understanding. Worthy to acknowledge are their overlapping views and growing steadfast support in the confrontation of American imperialism, despite having led parts of the Islamic world decades apart. Rather than two people sharing a common interest, the studies of Khomeini and Bin Laden rather imply a sentiment that characterizes Western intervention in Islamic foreign policy as the main factor of Muslim oppression. The two leaders react to U.S. imperialism similarly though policy and rhetoric, despite influencing Muslims decades apart. In response to conflicts with the
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government, although the U.S. persists to breach Islamic soil. An alliance can be produced if Muslims can regain total independence and control over their foreign policy. However, although both value “mutual respect and defending the country’s freedom and independence,” there exists an urge for retaliation (156).
“Your security is not in the hands of Kerry, or Bush, or Al Qaeda. It is in your hands, and any state that does not violate our security has automatically guaranteed its own” (Bin Laden 76-7).
Khomeini emphasizes that a peaceful conciliation is conceivable, as long as the West refrains from intervening Iran’s international affairs. In a like matter, Bin Laden reminds us in his “Message to the American People,” that every action has a reaction, an implication that the tragedies of 9/11 may have been avoided if the U.S. government ceased encroachment on Islamic soil. Bin Laden justifies the 9/11 “reaction” as a means to warn the U.S. that force will be involved to demobilize of American imperialism.
“God knows we would never have thought of striking the towers, had we not seen such tyranny and oppression… Only when we could take no more did we think of it” (Bin Laden
government, although the U.S. persists to breach Islamic soil. An alliance can be produced if Muslims can regain total independence and control over their foreign policy. However, although both value “mutual respect and defending the country’s freedom and independence,” there exists an urge for retaliation (156).
“Your security is not in the hands of Kerry, or Bush, or Al Qaeda. It is in your hands, and any state that does not violate our security has automatically guaranteed its own” (Bin Laden 76-7).
Khomeini emphasizes that a peaceful conciliation is conceivable, as long as the West refrains from intervening Iran’s international affairs. In a like matter, Bin Laden reminds us in his “Message to the American People,” that every action has a reaction, an implication that the tragedies of 9/11 may have been avoided if the U.S. government ceased encroachment on Islamic soil. Bin Laden justifies the 9/11 “reaction” as a means to warn the U.S. that force will be involved to demobilize of American imperialism.
“God knows we would never have thought of striking the towers, had we not seen such tyranny and oppression… Only when we could take no more did we think of it” (Bin Laden