Heidegger's Phenomenological Analysis

Heidegger sought to radicalize the traditional understanding of what it means to be human and the transform the ‘common sense’ approach held by the tradition by reawakening the question of the meaning of being; however, he arrived too early. Even though his unfinished edifice was successfully nailed on the door of Cartesian tradition long ago; the discussion fell, and is still falling, upon deaf ears.
This split with the tradition led him to a disagreement with his old master Edmund Husserl concerning the interpretation of Phenomenology. Heidegger’s reformation of phenomenology led him to reject Husserl’s notion of a transcendental ego’s relationship to objects with a more fundamental understanding; the interpretation of Dasein’s relationship …show more content…
More simply, how are we involved within the world? Forwarding the investigation in this way was a way of prioritizing everyday practical living experience over Husserl’s theoretical knowing. “Practice[knowing how] is always before theory[knowing that]”; The commonsense approach, held by the tradition completely misses how we are normally involved with the world. In our concerned everyday “going abouts” there is little or no conscious awareness of “that we are doing”. It appears as if we normally go through our day to day activities in a mindless haze; unaware of things as ‘things’ outside of our experience of them; admist it all. (Footnote) We orient ourselves unreflectively toward ‘enities’ we are concerned with and thus our already preconceived understanding of being. This concern allows us to manipulate tools and such [equipment] and put them to …show more content…
We are always involved in the world; we always already start with it. This notion is somewhat similar to Husserl’s “world view” as the absolute limit to what we can experience. As Husserl mentions in “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature”: the world is predesignated at any time”. Although Heidegger agrees that [worldhood] is the limit for average everyday lived experience, he would disagree with objectifying the spatiality of the world; Husserl cannot avoid explaining the world as ‘out there’ with this definition. There is no spatial meaning of the entities encountered in our unconscious everyday “going abouts”. To avoid this Cartesian problem, Heidegger must interpret how we are primarily involved with the world through how we normally encounter entities of our