There are multiple interpretations given to the fourth chapter, Self-Consciousness, of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Alexandre Kojève initiated a phenomenon that isolates the fourth chapter being an essay in itself discussing anthropology or social philosophy (Magrì 2016; Pippin 2010). These lectures given by Kojève influenced subsequent thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Sartre (Schmidt 1979). I am rejecting this kind of reading. This is a radical shift of Hegel’s reading from an epistemological account found in the first three chapters to sociality. Thus, I position my reading of Hegel’s Self-Consciousness with the more contemporary ones or what they call Hegel’s comeback to Analytic Philosophy. I would not consider my reading as Analytic,
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Pippin begun by highlighting these concepts: 1) ‘Self-consciousness is desire itself’, and 2) ‘Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness’. Pippin takes it to be that self-consciousness is a practical achievement from an animal to a rational one. But that commits him to a ‘contextual reading’, wherein one is committed to giving an interpretation of what desire is depending on where it is used (Jenkins 2009). For example, the usage of Desire in M167 and desire in M168 are totally different. Considering Linnaean taxa, Desire is a genus, while desire is a species. Self-consciousness is Desire in general (M167) and desire in itself (2010). Though undifferentiated by Pippin, I agree that this is a continuation of consciousness to self-consciousness (2010:39), however, this continuation is misrepresented. This desire that is self-consciousness is the desire that is motivated by sense-certainty. As consciousness relates “of object to knowing a passive unity”, ‘the ’I’ is the content of the connection and the connecting itself’ (M166). Desire that is self-consciousness tries to track down which is itself within the relation of consciousness and object. For self-consciousness, the conjunction of consciousness and object becomes its object. The discussion that Pippin provided, had already been mentioned in the first three chapters of the
Pippin begun by highlighting these concepts: 1) ‘Self-consciousness is desire itself’, and 2) ‘Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness’. Pippin takes it to be that self-consciousness is a practical achievement from an animal to a rational one. But that commits him to a ‘contextual reading’, wherein one is committed to giving an interpretation of what desire is depending on where it is used (Jenkins 2009). For example, the usage of Desire in M167 and desire in M168 are totally different. Considering Linnaean taxa, Desire is a genus, while desire is a species. Self-consciousness is Desire in general (M167) and desire in itself (2010). Though undifferentiated by Pippin, I agree that this is a continuation of consciousness to self-consciousness (2010:39), however, this continuation is misrepresented. This desire that is self-consciousness is the desire that is motivated by sense-certainty. As consciousness relates “of object to knowing a passive unity”, ‘the ’I’ is the content of the connection and the connecting itself’ (M166). Desire that is self-consciousness tries to track down which is itself within the relation of consciousness and object. For self-consciousness, the conjunction of consciousness and object becomes its object. The discussion that Pippin provided, had already been mentioned in the first three chapters of the