Heartbreak Ridge Research Paper

GEN Van Fleet felt that the NKPA was currently off balance from their earlier loss on Bloody Ridge and therefore wanted to take advantage of this opportunity to seize additional key terrain located on Heartbreak Ridge. As Gen. de Shazo agreed with GEN Van Fleet, he assigned the 23rd IN Reg as the main effort for this hasty attack. However, this attack was not backed by any intelligence but rather an assumption from the commanding General. Furthermore there was not effort to gain further or better intelligence estimates prior to the execution of the attack. On 13 September 1951, as the Battalions started their movement up the Satae-ri valley; they came across heavy fire from the NKPA mortars and artillery located in both valleys. The fires were so heavy that they only made it to the base of the ridge before having to halt and dig in for the night. As the Soldiers continued to inch their way up the hill they sustained large amounts of casualties. At the start of the second week, Adams was no closer to taking the remaining two hills than he had been days earlier and requested his Regiment be relieved due to the number of casualties sustained, but BG de Shazo denied his request.6 …show more content…
Young arrived to assume command of the 2nd ID but allowed BG de Shazo to remain in command while he acclimated himself to the ongoing situation; conducting his own reconnaissance of the area of operation (AO). On 27 September 1951 COL Adams, decided to have a discussion with his new commanding officer, MG Young about the problems occurring on Heartbreak Ridge. Supported by the French Commanders, he told MG Young that continuing the attacks would be “suicide.”7 Already, in the two week period the 23rd IN Reg had suffered nearly 1,000 casualties, while the remaining 2nd ID units had taken 700 or more casualties.8 This time the Commander listened to COL Adams and the attacks were finally