Harbinger of a Fatal Flaw
Sheikh Salman al Oudah, a Saudi cleric whom bin Laden had once lauded as his “ideal personality,” wrote an open letter to bin Laden repudiating the actions of al Qaeda (Wright, 2011, p. 67). Further disseminating the letter on the internet and to the media, Sheikh Salman scathingly rebuked al Qaeda’s indiscriminate murder of innocent people, arguing the “regime has stopped ruling people according to what God revealed” (Wright, 2011, p. 66). He condemend bin Laden’s lust for power and his sponsorship of various affiliates, blaming Osama for bringing ruin to the entire Muslin world (Wright, 2011, pp. 66-71). Sheikh al Oudah’s letter ended with the most painful blow of all: he disavowed al Qaeda, effectively severing …show more content…
52). Nonetheless, fortunes changed as Arab uprisings in the region provided ample opportunity for al Qaeda to capitilize on sectarian strife (Hoffman, 2012, p. 646). Initially welcomed as opportunities for democracy, the fall of several African and Middle Eastern regimes succumbed instead to “anarchy, despotic government, and militia violence” that opened the door of opportunity for al Qaeda affiliates (Celso, 2014, p. 39). Capitilizing as usual on failing governments, al Qaeda enjoyed a “burst of activism” (Celso, 2014, p. 35). However, the enjoyment of revitalization was tempered with Bin Laden’s mounting concern over the actions of various affiliates. In the final months before his death, bin Laden expressed the desire to more closely control the affiliates, and centralize media operations (Celso, 2014, p. 38). He was acutely aware of the damage being done to the al Qaeda name through the violent behaviours of its affiliates, and “sought a new name for the movement that would accurately reflect its ideological pretensions and self-appointed role as defender of Muslims everywhere” (Hoffman, 2012, p. 640). Affiliated networks such as those in Africa were incresingly “acting on the basics of their own judgements and initiatives” rather than adhereing to al Qaeda core precepts (Wilkos, 2014, p. 3). Bin Laden felt their focus on combatting the near enemy …show more content…
Failing to achieve a peace agreement, al-Qaeda disavowed ISIS in February of 2014. Al Qaeda General Command next took the unprecedented step of issuing a formal repudiation clearly stating the expulsion of ISIS from al Qaeda (Sly, 2014). Retaliation from ISIS came shortly after in the form of a suicide bombing that killed al-Suri (Baker, 2014). This wanton display of insubordination from an affiliate to al Qaeda core would have been “unthinkable in bin Laden’s era” (Celso, 2014, p. 41).
During the tug-of-war for supremacy, Baghdadi relocated to Syria lured many fighters from JN to ISIS (Zelin, 2013, September 10). To garner increased support, the group began to hold neighborhood forums that included fun games like tug-of-war. Additionally, they began to provide social services such as medical services, food, and fuel. ISIS also began to extend its outreach toward the next generation by publishing propaganda geared toward the younger set, and hosting child-friendly activities like Quranic recitation competitions and pie eating contests (Welsford, 2014, p.
Sheikh Salman al Oudah, a Saudi cleric whom bin Laden had once lauded as his “ideal personality,” wrote an open letter to bin Laden repudiating the actions of al Qaeda (Wright, 2011, p. 67). Further disseminating the letter on the internet and to the media, Sheikh Salman scathingly rebuked al Qaeda’s indiscriminate murder of innocent people, arguing the “regime has stopped ruling people according to what God revealed” (Wright, 2011, p. 66). He condemend bin Laden’s lust for power and his sponsorship of various affiliates, blaming Osama for bringing ruin to the entire Muslin world (Wright, 2011, pp. 66-71). Sheikh al Oudah’s letter ended with the most painful blow of all: he disavowed al Qaeda, effectively severing …show more content…
52). Nonetheless, fortunes changed as Arab uprisings in the region provided ample opportunity for al Qaeda to capitilize on sectarian strife (Hoffman, 2012, p. 646). Initially welcomed as opportunities for democracy, the fall of several African and Middle Eastern regimes succumbed instead to “anarchy, despotic government, and militia violence” that opened the door of opportunity for al Qaeda affiliates (Celso, 2014, p. 39). Capitilizing as usual on failing governments, al Qaeda enjoyed a “burst of activism” (Celso, 2014, p. 35). However, the enjoyment of revitalization was tempered with Bin Laden’s mounting concern over the actions of various affiliates. In the final months before his death, bin Laden expressed the desire to more closely control the affiliates, and centralize media operations (Celso, 2014, p. 38). He was acutely aware of the damage being done to the al Qaeda name through the violent behaviours of its affiliates, and “sought a new name for the movement that would accurately reflect its ideological pretensions and self-appointed role as defender of Muslims everywhere” (Hoffman, 2012, p. 640). Affiliated networks such as those in Africa were incresingly “acting on the basics of their own judgements and initiatives” rather than adhereing to al Qaeda core precepts (Wilkos, 2014, p. 3). Bin Laden felt their focus on combatting the near enemy …show more content…
Failing to achieve a peace agreement, al-Qaeda disavowed ISIS in February of 2014. Al Qaeda General Command next took the unprecedented step of issuing a formal repudiation clearly stating the expulsion of ISIS from al Qaeda (Sly, 2014). Retaliation from ISIS came shortly after in the form of a suicide bombing that killed al-Suri (Baker, 2014). This wanton display of insubordination from an affiliate to al Qaeda core would have been “unthinkable in bin Laden’s era” (Celso, 2014, p. 41).
During the tug-of-war for supremacy, Baghdadi relocated to Syria lured many fighters from JN to ISIS (Zelin, 2013, September 10). To garner increased support, the group began to hold neighborhood forums that included fun games like tug-of-war. Additionally, they began to provide social services such as medical services, food, and fuel. ISIS also began to extend its outreach toward the next generation by publishing propaganda geared toward the younger set, and hosting child-friendly activities like Quranic recitation competitions and pie eating contests (Welsford, 2014, p.