Greed and Grievance – a complementary approach
While many scholars dealing with the academic or policy implication of this debate align themselves with either the greed or grievance camp, others believe that it is the combination of the two that has the biggest explanatory power when it comes to exploring the motives behind intra-state conflict. As highlighted by Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007: 24), “grievances can be present without greed, but it is difficult to sustain greedy motives without some grievance. Although greed and grievance are regarded as competing views, they may be complimentary, as greed may lead to grievance and vice versa.” Those theorists that argue for the combination of both greed and grievance point out that sometimes …show more content…
Private motivation is most often based on the economic factors surrounding one’s life. Thus, in some instances the economic factor of motivation towards violence can be seen as the overriding incentive. Seemingly in line with Collier and Hoeffler’s model, war offers opportunities of employment and loot-seeking benefits. War can give birth to shadow economies which provide the combatants and insurgencies with monetary proceeds from the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources that flourishes in instances of conflict due to lack of regulation. The competition for resources in turn fuels the violence even more resulting in the prolonging of the conflict. A classic example of such economic motivation can be seen in the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, and Angola where ‘blood diamonds’ played an immense role in sustaining the conflict as profits from the illegal sale of these resources were used to purchase more arms (Beswick & Jackson 2011). Moreover, when one looks at the case of Afghanistan, it is apparent that the Taliban uses the illegal drug trade (mainly the opium export) as a route for profit. The group safeguards drug producers in return for protection fees and acts as a middleman in order to funnel the produce into the …show more content…
Often, after a nation had acquired independence only a single group or a faction of that group is able to gain power and in turn has the means to subjugate the other groups to their will while getting all the benefits of state power —''public employment, other public spending, and resource rents'' (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007: 29)—for themselves (see the cases of Burundi and Rwanda). Weak social contracts are also grounded in resource scarcity (especially in countries like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan), pre-colonial ethnic rivalries over territory, and the failure of these states to strengthen mechanisms of political representation. Hegre et al. (2001) highlight that greater state capacity could lower the risk of conflict in well established democracies and autocracies. The highest risk of conflict initiation happens during political transition deviating to or from democracy, and in imperfect democracies, or anocracies. It should also be noted that internal factors that lead to intra-state conflict often interact with external events, such as the Cold War, which supply the ruling elite and rebels with financial and ideological support. These processes result in the build up of grievances in the context of state favouritism and a failing social contract which ''would
While many scholars dealing with the academic or policy implication of this debate align themselves with either the greed or grievance camp, others believe that it is the combination of the two that has the biggest explanatory power when it comes to exploring the motives behind intra-state conflict. As highlighted by Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007: 24), “grievances can be present without greed, but it is difficult to sustain greedy motives without some grievance. Although greed and grievance are regarded as competing views, they may be complimentary, as greed may lead to grievance and vice versa.” Those theorists that argue for the combination of both greed and grievance point out that sometimes …show more content…
Private motivation is most often based on the economic factors surrounding one’s life. Thus, in some instances the economic factor of motivation towards violence can be seen as the overriding incentive. Seemingly in line with Collier and Hoeffler’s model, war offers opportunities of employment and loot-seeking benefits. War can give birth to shadow economies which provide the combatants and insurgencies with monetary proceeds from the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources that flourishes in instances of conflict due to lack of regulation. The competition for resources in turn fuels the violence even more resulting in the prolonging of the conflict. A classic example of such economic motivation can be seen in the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, and Angola where ‘blood diamonds’ played an immense role in sustaining the conflict as profits from the illegal sale of these resources were used to purchase more arms (Beswick & Jackson 2011). Moreover, when one looks at the case of Afghanistan, it is apparent that the Taliban uses the illegal drug trade (mainly the opium export) as a route for profit. The group safeguards drug producers in return for protection fees and acts as a middleman in order to funnel the produce into the …show more content…
Often, after a nation had acquired independence only a single group or a faction of that group is able to gain power and in turn has the means to subjugate the other groups to their will while getting all the benefits of state power —''public employment, other public spending, and resource rents'' (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007: 29)—for themselves (see the cases of Burundi and Rwanda). Weak social contracts are also grounded in resource scarcity (especially in countries like Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan), pre-colonial ethnic rivalries over territory, and the failure of these states to strengthen mechanisms of political representation. Hegre et al. (2001) highlight that greater state capacity could lower the risk of conflict in well established democracies and autocracies. The highest risk of conflict initiation happens during political transition deviating to or from democracy, and in imperfect democracies, or anocracies. It should also be noted that internal factors that lead to intra-state conflict often interact with external events, such as the Cold War, which supply the ruling elite and rebels with financial and ideological support. These processes result in the build up of grievances in the context of state favouritism and a failing social contract which ''would