GoPro experienced a remarkable turnover rise from 500,000$ in 2005 to 1.6 billion$ in 2015 (table1). The reason for this outstanding performance is GoPro’s revolutionary and unique way to capture video footage. In 2013 GoPro was the best-selling camera in the world with a worldwide brand awareness. The successful IPO in 2014 with a peak price per share reaching 98$ established its brand equity.
Nevertheless, the company in 2016 experience a 40% fall in sales in comparison to 2015 figures. Such decrease in sales led to a net loss of $419 million, compared to net income of 36.6 million in 2015 (GoPro Investor Presentation, 2017), forcing the company to cut off 370 stuff and reduce operating expenses (Wang, 2017). As a result, …show more content…
GoPro calls it ‘’a Virtuous Cycle’ (GoPro Investor Presentation, 2017) where the users are able to search through the web to see spectacular GoPro users videos and also share their experiences and moments with their GoPro. “Virtuous Cycle” is dedicated to exceptional quality content shared throughout the internet and GoPro’s goal is for all to upload powerful, emotionally and appealing User Generated Content (UGC). The power of GoPro UGS is that all users have ejaculated the “Be a Hero” moto increasing the company’s brand equity and awareness. Examples of the above can be, the ‘’5 Horrifying Shark Encounters Caught On GoPro’’ collection of videos with 21 million views (YouTube, …show more content…
More specifically, he argued that the company "failed to make GoPro contemporary and failed to align GoPro to the smartphone movement. The smartphone has set a new bar for convenience and for how much work consumers are willing to put into making video”. Once the company entered its IPO, stock price at first peaked at $24 per share, however GoPro sales in 2015 stagnated as the company failed to produce entertaining ventures and lacked innovation developments beyond the already established product line. Entering an IPO signified that the company had to move away from the YOLO mentality it had established and transit from a hardware to a software. The transition to a media brand was anticipated by investors and shareholders. Speculators saw GoPro’s entrance into the drone market as a way to diversify its rather rotten product mix portfolio. Nevertheless, the rather slow transition to a media company coupled with the disastrous launch of the Karma became an encapsulation of the continuous failures of the