While the world may be no more dangerous than it was during the height of the Cold War, globalization compounded by rapid technological change has increased the complexity and immediacy of conflicts. This “democratization of violence” along with the increasing “velocity of instability” has in turn heightened demands on the capability of the U.S. Joint Force to defend the homeland, project power, and protect our interests and allies around the world. This paper briefly reviews the global security environment and future trends, examines the implications of those trends for Joint Force 2025, and recommends a focus on three key areas: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); cyber; and special operations forces (SOF). Finally the
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New technologies are spreading among both state and non-state actors, challenging the traditional advantage of the United States in that area. These technologies not only pose a threat themselves (i.e., WMD and delivery system proliferation), but also impact “the calculus of deterrence and conflict management by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision space.” To address these factors, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) proposes “globally integrated operations” to integrate “emerging capabilities … with new ways of fighting and partnering.” Three emerging capabilities are singled out: SOF, cyber, and ISR. These three fall under the seventh of the concept’s eight elements, a basket of flexible, low-signature/small-footprint capabilities. The CCJO notes these capabilities will need to be more fully integrated into future joint operations, rather than employed by forces as adjuncts. Fuller integration would have a multiplier effect on the effectiveness of other capabilities, increase strategic flexibility and global responsiveness, and “perhaps most significantly, their use does not always constitute an irreversible policy …show more content…
Increased investment and emphasis here may reduce the Joint Force’s capabilities to address more regular or state-centered conflicts, where the probability is lower but the consequences are more severe. A possible mitigation would be to design the capabilities of SOF for maximum flexibility, enhancing their ability to work both ends of the continuum as well as the middle.
The intelligence aspects of ISR could be an example of internal risk, as addressing the sharing of intelligence across services and commands is of vital importance, for if intel is not developed and shared in a timely manner, it is of little value to the end user. A mitigation would be to rethink how intelligence specialists are trained and educated across all
New technologies are spreading among both state and non-state actors, challenging the traditional advantage of the United States in that area. These technologies not only pose a threat themselves (i.e., WMD and delivery system proliferation), but also impact “the calculus of deterrence and conflict management by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision space.” To address these factors, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) proposes “globally integrated operations” to integrate “emerging capabilities … with new ways of fighting and partnering.” Three emerging capabilities are singled out: SOF, cyber, and ISR. These three fall under the seventh of the concept’s eight elements, a basket of flexible, low-signature/small-footprint capabilities. The CCJO notes these capabilities will need to be more fully integrated into future joint operations, rather than employed by forces as adjuncts. Fuller integration would have a multiplier effect on the effectiveness of other capabilities, increase strategic flexibility and global responsiveness, and “perhaps most significantly, their use does not always constitute an irreversible policy …show more content…
Increased investment and emphasis here may reduce the Joint Force’s capabilities to address more regular or state-centered conflicts, where the probability is lower but the consequences are more severe. A possible mitigation would be to design the capabilities of SOF for maximum flexibility, enhancing their ability to work both ends of the continuum as well as the middle.
The intelligence aspects of ISR could be an example of internal risk, as addressing the sharing of intelligence across services and commands is of vital importance, for if intel is not developed and shared in a timely manner, it is of little value to the end user. A mitigation would be to rethink how intelligence specialists are trained and educated across all