Glimer Case Study

In Glimer, there was some ambiguity about the effect of the statutory exclusion for contracts of employment because, the arbitration clause was not in a contract between an employee and an employer, but rather was in a contract between an employee and the agency. The Supreme Court clarified the ambiguity in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, where the Court interpreted the exemption for “contracts of employment” exceptionally narrowly. The Court held that the statute applied to all contracts of employment except those involving workers who, like seamen and railroad workers, were engaged in transportation that crossed state lines. . Therefore, it is now clear that the FAA allows enforcement of agreements mandating arbitration of employment …show more content…
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett. where the Court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. The Court reasoned that, here, the arbitration provision was a "bargained-for exchange" in the collective bargaining agreement and thus should not be interfered with by the courts. The Court went on to state that because the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) itself did not mandate such interference, the arbitration provision should be enforced. There is a growing trend toward acceptance of arbitration as a means of resolving employment disputes. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) encourage the use of alternative to resolve …show more content…
In Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services, VI, Inc., the court found the agreement unconscionable because it required that “employee must present employee’s claim in written form to the Company within thirty calendar days of the event which forms the basis of the claim, unless a different time for presentation of the claim is provided for by the American Arbitration Association rules.” Despite this recent expansion of the kinds of claims that are arbitrable under the FAA, some courts have attempted to craft additional limitations on arbitrability. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai , the court refused to enforce an arbitration provision under the FAA as to a Title VII claim, finding that the broker’s Title VII claims were not arbitrable because she did not know she was signing a form that would permit arbitration of Title VII