Introduction
Coinciding with the Nazi takeover in 1933, Germany began a belligerent rearmament of the Wehrmacht by taking advantage of political and ideological strains in Europe and Russia. By rearming and reforming the German military, Hitler hoped to secure Germany’s global dominance by creating a powerful striking force, capable of rapid mobilization and decisive victory. In part, historians attribute Germany’s ability to rearm to liberating appeasement policies; however, another significant factor may have been the lack of innovation by Allied and Russian armed forces. Generally, effective innovation occurs when several favorable conditions coalesce, to include: political-military relations, civil-military collaboration, technology …show more content…
History shows that when faced with unpalatable choices and the reality of the environment-capability gap, leaders often cycle back to prior phases in the design process . The British Royal Navy confirmed this regression when they dismissed the findings of the 1924-1925 Newport simulations, which revealed superior advantage to carriers that could mass aircraft in repetitive pulses. Although, the Royal Navy lacked this capability, they discounted emerging doctrine from the US Marine Fleet Exercises and the Tentative Manual (1934), and presumed their flight deck configuration to be sufficient to achieve sea dominance. Similarly, when faced with a growing German threat, the French held steadfast to a curriculum of methodical war within their Command and Staff college. , Remarkably, even while the US, Britain, and Germany conducted numerous simulations in the 1920s validating wireless communication, mobile artillery, and decentralized command, the French held to the rigid belief that “le fue tue” (firepower kills doctrine) would …show more content…
Arguably, the US and the rest of the world had begun this conflict many years earlier. Beginning in 1970 with the first terrorist hijackings, and continuing over the next 40 years with over 30 lethal attacks against US interests; Islamic extremism has proven itself a persistent, and formidable threat to our national security. If we address Islamic extremism from a political, rather than religious perspective, we begin to see parallels between this decade and the interwar period. Just as Hitler sought to expand the German State through the ideology of lebensraum; the Islamic State, and it previous iterations, seek to establish a global Islamic Caliphate. Hence, The Caliphate’s center of gravity is its ability to hold and expand terrain, enabling the spread of a political ideology known as “Islamism”, which has demonstrated an ability to influence the global strategic environment. Oddly, the US appears to be navigating toward a rigid doctrine reminiscent of “limited liability”, which relies on foreign nations and SOF (in lieu of naval and air power) to defeat this
Coinciding with the Nazi takeover in 1933, Germany began a belligerent rearmament of the Wehrmacht by taking advantage of political and ideological strains in Europe and Russia. By rearming and reforming the German military, Hitler hoped to secure Germany’s global dominance by creating a powerful striking force, capable of rapid mobilization and decisive victory. In part, historians attribute Germany’s ability to rearm to liberating appeasement policies; however, another significant factor may have been the lack of innovation by Allied and Russian armed forces. Generally, effective innovation occurs when several favorable conditions coalesce, to include: political-military relations, civil-military collaboration, technology …show more content…
History shows that when faced with unpalatable choices and the reality of the environment-capability gap, leaders often cycle back to prior phases in the design process . The British Royal Navy confirmed this regression when they dismissed the findings of the 1924-1925 Newport simulations, which revealed superior advantage to carriers that could mass aircraft in repetitive pulses. Although, the Royal Navy lacked this capability, they discounted emerging doctrine from the US Marine Fleet Exercises and the Tentative Manual (1934), and presumed their flight deck configuration to be sufficient to achieve sea dominance. Similarly, when faced with a growing German threat, the French held steadfast to a curriculum of methodical war within their Command and Staff college. , Remarkably, even while the US, Britain, and Germany conducted numerous simulations in the 1920s validating wireless communication, mobile artillery, and decentralized command, the French held to the rigid belief that “le fue tue” (firepower kills doctrine) would …show more content…
Arguably, the US and the rest of the world had begun this conflict many years earlier. Beginning in 1970 with the first terrorist hijackings, and continuing over the next 40 years with over 30 lethal attacks against US interests; Islamic extremism has proven itself a persistent, and formidable threat to our national security. If we address Islamic extremism from a political, rather than religious perspective, we begin to see parallels between this decade and the interwar period. Just as Hitler sought to expand the German State through the ideology of lebensraum; the Islamic State, and it previous iterations, seek to establish a global Islamic Caliphate. Hence, The Caliphate’s center of gravity is its ability to hold and expand terrain, enabling the spread of a political ideology known as “Islamism”, which has demonstrated an ability to influence the global strategic environment. Oddly, the US appears to be navigating toward a rigid doctrine reminiscent of “limited liability”, which relies on foreign nations and SOF (in lieu of naval and air power) to defeat this