Fsb Mary Ann's Failure

In 1971, as US involvement in the Vietnam War wound down, the Soldiers on a small fire support base (FSB) named Mary Ann had to fight for their lives during one of the Vietcong’s most audacious attacks. Analyzed below are specific aspects of mission command and their utilization by the leaders of the 1-46th Infantry Battalion. There were success and failures by leaders at all echelons. The United States’ slight victory in the defense of FSB Mary Ann was the result of tenacious fighting on behalf of the US Soldiers. However, the US commanders’ failures to understand, visualize, assess, and lead allowed such a daring attack to occur. To understand how things devolved at FSB Mary Ann covered below is the brief history of the events leading up …show more content…
France was determined to maintain Vietnam as their French Indo China colony. As France commenced a buildup of forces, a guerrilla movement began in 1946 and the first French Indo China war arose. The war ended in 1954 with the signing of the Geneva Accords, French Indo china dissolved, into two countries North and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel north. The situation in Vietnam was quickly changing. Due to instability throughout the country and after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the United States became involved in ground combat in 1965. At the height of the war, there were over 500,000 US service members in Vietnam. With the popularity of the Vietnam War dwindling quickly, the US began withdrawing troops in 1969. Even though massive withdrawals occurred the year prior, the 1-46th Infantry Battalion established FSB Mary Ann to support operations in the …show more content…
When establishing the FSB the leaders of the 23rd Infantry Division understood that they needed a fire support base to provide effective indirect fires in support of the patrols in the area. They also understood that it must be within the range of the brigade’s artillery support unit. They did an excellent job visualizing elements of the unknown. However, the leaders did not visualize the location of the FSB from the viewpoint of the enemy. The FSB was “on a hill, but in a saddle with hills around it on three sides. To the west, and east across the river, there were hills that were higher, and the ridgeline on which the firebase was built extended to higher elevations towards the north” . This placed the FSB in a saddle, which was not a good defensible location. This failure to visualize from a viewpoint other than their own allowed the enemy to establish over watch of the FSB. This in turn allowed the enemy mortar teams a marked advantage during the