• ½ Page: Intro
God knows all. A common phrase backed by many theologians and philosophers. However, the statement is not as simple as it first seems. For don’t humans have free will? And for free will to be free, must no one predetermine it? And if no one predetermines it, then surely how can God know it? This question is avoided more than attacked, but nonetheless has been answered by many great thinkers. To begin, we must first clarify our terms of God, free will, and omniscience. God, in the Abrahamic religion, is defined as an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being. Free will refers to the ability to freely choose between multiple actions at any given point in time. And omniscience is defined as knowing all things, both those that …show more content…
One such person is Molina, who developed a way of thought called Molinism. Molinism involves introducing a new realm into God’s knowledge. Traditionally, God has two types of knowledge, natural and free. Natural refers to those a priori truths, like that triangles have three sides. Free knowledge refers to the knowledge God knows through his own will, like what he creates. Molinism adds a third section called middle knowledge, which is composed of every possible person in every possible situation, and how those people would freely act in each of the situations (Hasker, 2009, …show more content…
Molinism’s middle knowledge is described as this collection of knowledge composed of what all possible people would freely do in all possible situation, even if the person never actually ends up in that situation, or more importantly, ever exists at all. This definition raises the key issue of giving properties to things that do not exist. Take Caterus’s (2009) “Existent Lion.” When the lion exists, it exists essentially, however if it doesn’t exist, then the property of existing does not apply (p. 86). In other words, if one denies that the being exists, then their properties do not follow. The same applies when discussing free will. In order to have free will, a being must exist. If the being in question did not exist, then what is wills the decision? As such, Molinism leaves a major flaw in the premise of knowing will without
God knows all. A common phrase backed by many theologians and philosophers. However, the statement is not as simple as it first seems. For don’t humans have free will? And for free will to be free, must no one predetermine it? And if no one predetermines it, then surely how can God know it? This question is avoided more than attacked, but nonetheless has been answered by many great thinkers. To begin, we must first clarify our terms of God, free will, and omniscience. God, in the Abrahamic religion, is defined as an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being. Free will refers to the ability to freely choose between multiple actions at any given point in time. And omniscience is defined as knowing all things, both those that …show more content…
One such person is Molina, who developed a way of thought called Molinism. Molinism involves introducing a new realm into God’s knowledge. Traditionally, God has two types of knowledge, natural and free. Natural refers to those a priori truths, like that triangles have three sides. Free knowledge refers to the knowledge God knows through his own will, like what he creates. Molinism adds a third section called middle knowledge, which is composed of every possible person in every possible situation, and how those people would freely act in each of the situations (Hasker, 2009, …show more content…
Molinism’s middle knowledge is described as this collection of knowledge composed of what all possible people would freely do in all possible situation, even if the person never actually ends up in that situation, or more importantly, ever exists at all. This definition raises the key issue of giving properties to things that do not exist. Take Caterus’s (2009) “Existent Lion.” When the lion exists, it exists essentially, however if it doesn’t exist, then the property of existing does not apply (p. 86). In other words, if one denies that the being exists, then their properties do not follow. The same applies when discussing free will. In order to have free will, a being must exist. If the being in question did not exist, then what is wills the decision? As such, Molinism leaves a major flaw in the premise of knowing will without