How ought we make moral decisions? Aristotle will say that we ought to act according to virtue, while Foot similarly argues that we ought to act according to our ‘natural good’. In this paper, I will discuss Aristotle’s view of a virtues and Foot’s derived concept of natural facts about what humans ought to do when it comes to morality. I will also consider some problems I find with both Foot’s and Aristotle’s ideas that there is or can be an objective good. I will argue that human beings ought to make moral decisions based on their subjective good, mainly because that’s the only thing we are capable of.
Happiness, as defined by Aristotle is the complete good for a human being. While this definition is generally accepted, views about what to …show more content…
For example a plant has a vegetative nature and is flourishing when it is nourished and grows to the best of its ability. Humans, on the other hand, have a rational nature, so it would be correct to say that by using reason as a foundation, when we practice virtues constructed under reason, we flourish. Finally, to be able to consider whether or not one has lived a virtuous life, we must look at the life as a whole and this can only be done after the life has been lived.
In Natural Goodness, the first thing Foot does is call into question subjectivism. Not only does she combat non-cognitivism, but also desire based moral judgements, which she admits to purporting earlier in her career. Instead, Foot suggests that there is ‘moral evil’ as it is equivalent to ‘natural defect’. She ties our rationality to virtue while considering our society as a …show more content…
Basically, Foot is looking at the way we humans observe the world around us and is careful about taking that mold and shifting it with humans in the view point. She makes a distinction from things that have been evolutionarily adaptive and things that function in the moment of an individual's life within that species. Foot states that the difference between mere statistical averages and Aristotelian Categoricals is that the latter has to do with the teleology of the species and is the thing capable of making judgements of defectiveness because, 'It matters in the reproductive life of the peacock that the tail should be brightly coloured', and so can be counted as a defect.
Continuing, it is important note that Foot has a particular definition for good that seems to objectify it’s use when used across species, human or not. For example a tree’s ‘good roots’ is the same structural good as a human’s moral good, thus referring to a ‘natural goodness’. Foot specifically points out that some utilitarian instances of good being something that brings us closer to flourishing has no place in her conception of ‘natural goodness’ because it doesn’t automatically assume that it is inherently good for some species to
Happiness, as defined by Aristotle is the complete good for a human being. While this definition is generally accepted, views about what to …show more content…
For example a plant has a vegetative nature and is flourishing when it is nourished and grows to the best of its ability. Humans, on the other hand, have a rational nature, so it would be correct to say that by using reason as a foundation, when we practice virtues constructed under reason, we flourish. Finally, to be able to consider whether or not one has lived a virtuous life, we must look at the life as a whole and this can only be done after the life has been lived.
In Natural Goodness, the first thing Foot does is call into question subjectivism. Not only does she combat non-cognitivism, but also desire based moral judgements, which she admits to purporting earlier in her career. Instead, Foot suggests that there is ‘moral evil’ as it is equivalent to ‘natural defect’. She ties our rationality to virtue while considering our society as a …show more content…
Basically, Foot is looking at the way we humans observe the world around us and is careful about taking that mold and shifting it with humans in the view point. She makes a distinction from things that have been evolutionarily adaptive and things that function in the moment of an individual's life within that species. Foot states that the difference between mere statistical averages and Aristotelian Categoricals is that the latter has to do with the teleology of the species and is the thing capable of making judgements of defectiveness because, 'It matters in the reproductive life of the peacock that the tail should be brightly coloured', and so can be counted as a defect.
Continuing, it is important note that Foot has a particular definition for good that seems to objectify it’s use when used across species, human or not. For example a tree’s ‘good roots’ is the same structural good as a human’s moral good, thus referring to a ‘natural goodness’. Foot specifically points out that some utilitarian instances of good being something that brings us closer to flourishing has no place in her conception of ‘natural goodness’ because it doesn’t automatically assume that it is inherently good for some species to