Flight 2253 Case Study

1294 Words 6 Pages
This case study discusses in great detail the December 29th, 2010, incident involving American Airlines flight 2253. This aircraft is a Boeing 757-200 with the registered tail number of N668AA. Upon landing, this large commercial airliner ran off the departure end of runway 19 and came to a gentle stop in deep snow at Jackson Hole Airport, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. The occupants were not injured, and the airplane sustained minor damage (NTSB, 2010). The subsequent accident investigation revealed some areas of improvement in regards to pilot training, systems operation or in-operation, and proper emergency situations. As a result of this investigation, three new safety recommendations are issued and three existing safety recommendations are …show more content…
The aircraft stopped in deep snow about 730 feet past the departure end of the runway. All souls aboard, which consisted of 2 pilots, 4 flight attendants, and 179 passengers, were uninjured and the aircraft suffered minor damage. The flight was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. The aircraft was operated by and registered to American Airlines as a scheduled domestic flight. The flight began at Chicago’s O’hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois, at about 0941 Central Standard Time. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded statements between the pilot and co-pilot and indicated that the first officer was the pilot on the controls and the captain was monitoring the flight. During the interviews following the incident, both crew members stated they were very familiar with the extremely challenging landing conditions that could exist at Jackson Hole Airport during winter conditions (for example the high landing weights that frequently occurred during ski season). The pilots also stressed, during post incident interviews, that they were especially cautious in preparing for the approach and landing into …show more content…
A pilot of a small corporate jet had reported about an hour earlier that the runway had “good” braking action in the first two thirds of the runway, however, the last one third braking action should be considered “poor”. The most current MU friction values for the runway were obtained about 18 minutes before the incident airplane’s landing and indicated values of 0.43, 0.43, and 0.39 for the first, second, and third sections of the runway, respectively (NTSB, 2010). The Greek letter MU (pronounced “myew”), is used to designate a friction value representing runway surface conditions (AIM, 2016). The MU (friction) values today, range from 0 to 100. At the time of this incident, the MU scale was based upon 0.0 to 1.0. 0.0 being the slipperiest (or no friction) to 1.0 being the most friction (or normal, dry conditions). After determining that the plane was safe and legal to land based on the existing landing conditions, weight of the aircraft, braking ability within the first two thirds of runway 19, the captain and first officer began the

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