WWI waged on for a devastating four years, yet in only six weeks, France succumbed to German attack and plunged society into its next world war. Historians wrestle with explanations, trying to pin-point specific political, psychological and military French failures which were the catalyst for the actual Fall of France. For these researchers, trying to demystify events often resurrects their own personal perspectives on history. Sometimes their bias seeps into their works. None-the-less, Julian Jackson, Marc Bloch and William D. Irvine have all contributed stunning insights into this May-June 1940s period, unraveling nuances for the Fall of France.
On November 11, 1918, Germany surrendered to England and France and, between them, signed the …show more content…
Irvine posits that the defeat rested largely on strategic military miscalculations. In Domestic Politics and the Fall of France in 1940, Irvine mainly focuses on disproving Bloch’s assessment of France’s prewar ideology and politics. He finds Marc Bloch’s socio-political analysis ‘rather short and disappointing’ (Irvine 79). Irvine emphasizes that the defeat was not a manifestation of tumultuous political years precursing the war, as Bloch insisted. While there were many different feuding political parties in France, Irvine insists that political unrest does not always lead to defeat as documented with the 1792 victory at Valmy (Irvine 79). Irvine does not find these socio-political preconditions a sole satisfactory answer for The Fall. He acknowledges that France in the early to mid 1930’s was in a disunified state, however, he believes it was not the main cause for German success. Bloch writes that the Conservatives abandoned their anti-German stance out of hatred for the Popular Front and that the Right believed that remaining firm on Germany would bring about a revolution. Bloch maintained that these tumultuous times and political hostilities, in theory, may have led to an early defeat in 1940 (Irvine 80). Irvine argues that the Right, with the Popular Front “dissolved,” would have reverted back to “Germanophobic nationalism” in 1939 (Irvine 81). Bloch blames the Left workers who were primarily interested in higher wages, in lieu of nationalistic pride, for The Fall (Irvine 83). However, Irvine stipulates that the workers did exceed the average 40 hour a week mandate, despite lobbying for less. Irvine insists that the workers did produce war materials and airplanes quicker than previously acknowledged and they were not a variable for failure (Irvine
On November 11, 1918, Germany surrendered to England and France and, between them, signed the …show more content…
Irvine posits that the defeat rested largely on strategic military miscalculations. In Domestic Politics and the Fall of France in 1940, Irvine mainly focuses on disproving Bloch’s assessment of France’s prewar ideology and politics. He finds Marc Bloch’s socio-political analysis ‘rather short and disappointing’ (Irvine 79). Irvine emphasizes that the defeat was not a manifestation of tumultuous political years precursing the war, as Bloch insisted. While there were many different feuding political parties in France, Irvine insists that political unrest does not always lead to defeat as documented with the 1792 victory at Valmy (Irvine 79). Irvine does not find these socio-political preconditions a sole satisfactory answer for The Fall. He acknowledges that France in the early to mid 1930’s was in a disunified state, however, he believes it was not the main cause for German success. Bloch writes that the Conservatives abandoned their anti-German stance out of hatred for the Popular Front and that the Right believed that remaining firm on Germany would bring about a revolution. Bloch maintained that these tumultuous times and political hostilities, in theory, may have led to an early defeat in 1940 (Irvine 80). Irvine argues that the Right, with the Popular Front “dissolved,” would have reverted back to “Germanophobic nationalism” in 1939 (Irvine 81). Bloch blames the Left workers who were primarily interested in higher wages, in lieu of nationalistic pride, for The Fall (Irvine 83). However, Irvine stipulates that the workers did exceed the average 40 hour a week mandate, despite lobbying for less. Irvine insists that the workers did produce war materials and airplanes quicker than previously acknowledged and they were not a variable for failure (Irvine