Introduction
Failed illusions by Charles Gati examines the events leading up to and surrounding the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. Gati argues that all the major players in the drama failed to provide adequate if any reasonable leadership. Throughout the drama the USSR gave vague and often conflicting orders to their Hungarian satellite. The Hungarians responded by attempting to fulfill their soviet overseers orders to no avail. The Hungarian leadership then was thrown into turmoil, and under the leadership of Imgey Nagy the Hungarians demanded some concessions from the soviets in an attempt to avert the revolt from turning into an open revolution. During the events the United States through Radio free Europe encouraged Hungarians …show more content…
This military occupation translated into a political occupation reinforced by Churchill and Stalin’s secrete agreement on spheres of influence negotiated at Yalta. It is hard to separate the Hungarian and Soviet governments when analyzing the events of the Hungarian revolt. Hungry was in essence a puppet state of the Soviet Union. Much of the Hungarian leadership had spent years if not decades in the Soviet Union and these communists were installed after the war. The revolt can almost be viewed as an internal struggle of the USSR due to the nature of control the Kremlin had over the …show more content…
The US secretary of state indicated to the soviets “We do not look upon these nations [Poland and Hungary] as potential military allies. We see them as a new and friendly states in a no longer divided Europe. ”Gati 163. Diplomatically that was the extent of US involvement. The CIA never the less continued to instill the promise of support through radio free Europe. In all actuality “the United States would not have been present in Hungary; for most Hungarian if it were not for RFE.” Gati 96. Typical US foreign policy was “…dynamic and confrontational.”Gati 69. , but the “…plans, detailed and carefully considered, did not translate into practice. ”Gati 70. The CIA broadcast may have served to instill in the demonstrators the idea that ant-communist revolution would lead to US intervention. The Hungarians “…felt the effects of the misleading signals even more so than other Soviet Satellite’s. Gati 72. Even after the soviet invasion, Radio free Europe encouraged the Romanian’s to resist the soviet advance. The sad part was that the United States had no intentions to help the Hungarians, and when the revolt transpired had no assets to provide even the minimum of assistance either militarily or economically. What is not debatable is“…the RFE’s unprofessional treatment of the 1956 crisis is
Failed illusions by Charles Gati examines the events leading up to and surrounding the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. Gati argues that all the major players in the drama failed to provide adequate if any reasonable leadership. Throughout the drama the USSR gave vague and often conflicting orders to their Hungarian satellite. The Hungarians responded by attempting to fulfill their soviet overseers orders to no avail. The Hungarian leadership then was thrown into turmoil, and under the leadership of Imgey Nagy the Hungarians demanded some concessions from the soviets in an attempt to avert the revolt from turning into an open revolution. During the events the United States through Radio free Europe encouraged Hungarians …show more content…
This military occupation translated into a political occupation reinforced by Churchill and Stalin’s secrete agreement on spheres of influence negotiated at Yalta. It is hard to separate the Hungarian and Soviet governments when analyzing the events of the Hungarian revolt. Hungry was in essence a puppet state of the Soviet Union. Much of the Hungarian leadership had spent years if not decades in the Soviet Union and these communists were installed after the war. The revolt can almost be viewed as an internal struggle of the USSR due to the nature of control the Kremlin had over the …show more content…
The US secretary of state indicated to the soviets “We do not look upon these nations [Poland and Hungary] as potential military allies. We see them as a new and friendly states in a no longer divided Europe. ”Gati 163. Diplomatically that was the extent of US involvement. The CIA never the less continued to instill the promise of support through radio free Europe. In all actuality “the United States would not have been present in Hungary; for most Hungarian if it were not for RFE.” Gati 96. Typical US foreign policy was “…dynamic and confrontational.”Gati 69. , but the “…plans, detailed and carefully considered, did not translate into practice. ”Gati 70. The CIA broadcast may have served to instill in the demonstrators the idea that ant-communist revolution would lead to US intervention. The Hungarians “…felt the effects of the misleading signals even more so than other Soviet Satellite’s. Gati 72. Even after the soviet invasion, Radio free Europe encouraged the Romanian’s to resist the soviet advance. The sad part was that the United States had no intentions to help the Hungarians, and when the revolt transpired had no assets to provide even the minimum of assistance either militarily or economically. What is not debatable is“…the RFE’s unprofessional treatment of the 1956 crisis is