Upon its 2006 release, policy analysts heralded FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (COIN) as a welcome solution to the intractable problems confronting American soldiers in Iraq. The manual served an important purpose by providing a common approach to operational problems that US forces faced in Iraq at the time. Renamed Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, the 2014 update incorporated lessons from the manual’s use in both Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the inclusion of indirect methods of security cooperation with local partners and the “identify-separate-isolate-influence-reintegrate” approach. A full evaluation of FM 3-24, however, must account for its most significant deficiency. FM 3-24’s critical weakness lies in its theoretical basis—the
…show more content…
In the overwhelming majority of decolonization wars, population-centric methods often succeeded militarily in establishing security, but failed to create political legitimacy. In Algeria, French troops systematically employed torture during interrogations, imposed draconian control measures on the Arab population, and forcibly relocated hostile populations—a tactic which the British also used to great effect in Malaya and Kenya. Beyond forced relocation, Britain’s post-1945 counterinsurgency campaigns involved a heavy dose of repression designed to establish security. British forces upheld the rule of law, but this “rule of law” included the implementation of harsh repressive legislation to isolate the population from the insurgency by controlling civilian movement through curfews and travel restrictions. Colonial authorities also manipulated the law to facilitate convictions of suspected insurgents. Furthermore, colonial officials regularly failed to enforce the rules of engagement restricting soldiers to the use of minimum force. Such actions did not establish political legitimacy. Instead they served to secure the government and isolate insurgents from the population. FM 3-24’s vision of population-centric COIN as the path to legitimate governance was a
In the overwhelming majority of decolonization wars, population-centric methods often succeeded militarily in establishing security, but failed to create political legitimacy. In Algeria, French troops systematically employed torture during interrogations, imposed draconian control measures on the Arab population, and forcibly relocated hostile populations—a tactic which the British also used to great effect in Malaya and Kenya. Beyond forced relocation, Britain’s post-1945 counterinsurgency campaigns involved a heavy dose of repression designed to establish security. British forces upheld the rule of law, but this “rule of law” included the implementation of harsh repressive legislation to isolate the population from the insurgency by controlling civilian movement through curfews and travel restrictions. Colonial authorities also manipulated the law to facilitate convictions of suspected insurgents. Furthermore, colonial officials regularly failed to enforce the rules of engagement restricting soldiers to the use of minimum force. Such actions did not establish political legitimacy. Instead they served to secure the government and isolate insurgents from the population. FM 3-24’s vision of population-centric COIN as the path to legitimate governance was a