He suggests that this is due to the extrinsic injustice present, or the effects (136). Moral condemnation also depends on whether the attitudes producing the acts were widespread, and whether the acts figure in an “accumulative harm” (137). Some may insist, however, that they are immoral regardless of their part in a collectively harmful set of behaviors. Mason thinks that this intuition stems from the idea that we are morally required to treat others as equals because the alternative involves disrespect (138). Even if individuals are warranted in demanding equal “recognition respect,” he maintains that failing to equally give this respect is not intrinsically unjust (141). A disrespectful act is intrinsically unjust only when it is essentially disadvantageous, or “by its nature deprive[s] people of an important good” (142). On this view, failing to treat others as equals is inherently immoral, but not always intrinsically unjust
He suggests that this is due to the extrinsic injustice present, or the effects (136). Moral condemnation also depends on whether the attitudes producing the acts were widespread, and whether the acts figure in an “accumulative harm” (137). Some may insist, however, that they are immoral regardless of their part in a collectively harmful set of behaviors. Mason thinks that this intuition stems from the idea that we are morally required to treat others as equals because the alternative involves disrespect (138). Even if individuals are warranted in demanding equal “recognition respect,” he maintains that failing to equally give this respect is not intrinsically unjust (141). A disrespectful act is intrinsically unjust only when it is essentially disadvantageous, or “by its nature deprive[s] people of an important good” (142). On this view, failing to treat others as equals is inherently immoral, but not always intrinsically unjust